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THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S ARCHITECTS'
AND BUILDERS' STATUTE OF REPOSE:
ITS APPLICATION AND NEED
FOR AMENDMENT
Gerald W Heller*
In 1972 Congress amended title 12 of the District of Columbia Code to
provide a statutory time limitation governing actions for injury or death
caused by defective or unsafe improvements to real property. Broadly
speaking, the amendment, now set forth in section 12-310 of the District of
Columbia Code, bars any action seeking damages for personal injury, injury
to real or personal property, or wrongful death caused by a defective or un-
safe improvement to real property if the injury or death forming the basis of
the action does not occur within ten years of substantial completion of the
improvement.' Section 12-310 also bars claims for contribution and indem-
* Assistant United States Attorney, Department of Justice. A.B., Princeton University;
J.D., University of Virginia. This article was written while the author was an associate with
the law firm of Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley and Casey. He is cur-
rently an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. The views expressed
in the article are his own and not necessarily those of the Department of Justice.
1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310 (1981 & Supp. 1985). Section 12-310 of the Code
provides:
(a)(1) Except as provided in subsection (b), any action-
(A) to recover damages for-
(i) personal injury,
(ii) injury to real or personal property, or
(iii) wrongful death, resulting from the defective or unsafe condition of an
improvement to real property, and
(B) for contribution or indemnity which is brought as a result of such injury or
death, shall be barred unless in the case where injury is the basis of such action,
such injury occurs within the ten-year period beginning on the date the improve-
ment was substantially completed, or in the case where death is the basis of such
action, either such death or the injury resulting in such death occurs within such
ten-year period.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, an improvement to real property shall be
considered substantially completed when-
(A) it is first used, or
(B) it is first available for use after having been completed in accordance with the
contract or agreement covering the improvement, including any agreed changes to
the contract or agreement, whichever occurs first.
(b) The limitation of actions prescribed in subsection (a) shall not apply to-
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nity if the injury or death does not occur within this same ten-year period.2
According to the legislative proponents of section 12-310, the purpose of
the statute is "[t]o provide a limitation on the period of time during which
an action may be brought to recover damages, contribution, or indemnity
against architects, designers, engineers, or contractors on the ground of a
defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property." 3 With
the enactment of section 12-310, the District of Columbia joined over forty
other jurisdictions that specifically prescribe a limitation period for actions
relating to defective or unsafe improvements to real property.
4
Although section 12-310 may operate as the functional equivalent of a
statute of limitations in certain circumstances, the section is more properly
characterized as a statute of repose. A typical tort statute of limitations, for
(1) any action based on a contract, express or implied, or
(2) any action brought against the person who, at the time the defective or
unsafe condition of the improvement to real property caused injury or death,
was the owner of or in actual possession or control of such real property.
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-310(a)(1) to -310(b)(2) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
2. Id. § 12-310(a)(1)(B).
3. 118 CONG. REC. 36,939 (1972).
4. Id. Forty-five states have enacted statutes analogous to § 12-310: ALA. CODE § 6-5-
218 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-237 to 27-244 (Supp.
1983); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 337.1, 337.15 (1972 & West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-80-127 (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584(a) (West Supp. 1984); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8127 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1982); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-3-50 to 9-3-53 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-8 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE
§ 5-241 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-214 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-20-2 (Burns Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.135 (Baldwin 1979); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2772 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-A (1964);
MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108 (1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260 § 2B
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5839 (West Supp. 1984) (Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 27A.5839 (Callaghan 1977)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (West Supp. 1984);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.097 (Vernon Supp. 1984);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-208 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-223 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 11.205 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-b (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1 (West
Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01-44 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (Page 1981); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 109-110 (West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.135 (1981); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5536 (Purdon 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-29 (Supp. 1982); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 15-2-630 to 15-2-670 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-2-9
to 15-2-11 (1967 & Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3-201 to 28-3-203 (1980); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a (Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5
(1977); VA. CODE § 8.01-250 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.16.300 to 4.16.320 (Supp.
1984-1985); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6a (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.89 (West 1983);
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (Supp. 1984).
New York has a statute of limitations for professional liability claims generally. See N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. LAW § 214.6 (McKinney 1972). The remaining jurisdictions-Arizona, Iowa,
Kansas, and Vermont-have not enacted special legislation dealing with claims arising from
improvements to real property.
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example, establishes a time limit, usually commencing upon the date of in-
jury, within which the plaintiff may bring suit. A statute of repose, on the
other hand, is qualitatively different from a statute of limitations. A statute
of repose extinguishes a party's substantive right after a specified time period
irrespective of the time of the party's injury. The time limit established by a
statute of repose may expire-and accordingly bar any cause of action gov-
erned by the statute-prior to the time of the party's injury. Consequently,
even though the ultimate effect of a statute of limitations or repose may be
the same in terms of precluding an action, a statute of repose may bar an
action even before a party has suffered damage that otherwise might be
compensable.5
Section 12-310 has received scant attention since its enactment. Indeed,
there exists no reported District of Columbia decision applying the statute or
interpreting its parameters. 6 The language of section 12-310, however, raises
5. For a discussion of the differences between a statute of limitations and statute of re-
pose, see, e.g., Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Constr. Co., 462 A.2d 416, 419
(Del. Super. Ct. 1983); Sowders v. M.W. Kellogg, Co., 663 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. Civ. App.
1983); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514, 516 (1982); Rosenberg v. Town of
North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, 666 (1972). See also Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 1242, § 2
(1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 comment g (1979).
Throughout this article, the time period established by § 12-310 is sometimes referred to as
one of "limitations." This characterization is accurate insofar as § 12-310 requires enumerated
actions to be commenced within a certain time period. Nevertheless, § 12-310 should not be
confused with a normal statute of limitations. Unlike the usual statute of limitations, § 12-310
may bar a cause of action even before the occurrence of an injury or death that otherwise
would be actionable.
6. Immediately prior to publication of this article, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals decided the case of J.H. Westerman Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 84-501, slip
op. (D.C. Oct. 4, 1985). In that case, the court specifically held that a manufacturer of compo-
nent parts of a heating system may raise the defense provided by § 12-310. The only other
reported case interpreting § 12-310 is from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland. See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Madden, 505 F. Supp. 557
(D. Md.), affid in part and appeal dismissed in part, 660 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1981). See also
Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1201 n.14 (D.C. 1984) (court declines to
address what impact, if any, § 12-3 10 has on a suit alleging tort and contract claims against the
builder of a home addition). Architects' and builders' statutes of repose such as § 12-3 10, have
engendered a fairly substantial amount of commentary. See, e.g., Collins, Limitation of Action
Statutes for Architects and Builders-An Examination of Constitutionality, 29 FED'N INS.
COUNS. Q. 41 (1978); Knapp & Lee, Application of Special Statutes of Limitations Concerning
Design and Construction, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351 (1979); McGovern, The Variety, Policy, and
Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579 (1981); Rogers,
The Constitutionality ofAlabama's Statute of Limitations for Construction Litigation: The Leg-
islature Tries Again, 11 CUM. L. REV. 1 (1980); Sisson & Kelley, Statutes of Limitations for the
Design and Building Professions-Will They Survive Constitutional Attack, 49 INS. COUNS. J.
243 (1982); Statkus, Limitations of Actions-Statute of Limitations for Architects and Builders
As Special Legislation, Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980), 16 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 313 (198 1); Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Build-
ers-Blueprintfor Non-Action, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 361 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
1985]
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difficult questions concerning the scope of the statute's provisions. The stat-
ute fails to define "an improvement to real property" and, more significantly,
does not identify those persons who may raise the defense created by the
statute. This latter omission carries important consequences. Although the
legislative history accompanying section 12-310 evidences an intent to insu-
late architects and other members of the construction industry from liability
after a specified time period, the statutory language does not state that these
parties are the exclusive parties within the ambit of the statute. Because of
this omission, other persons not directly involved in the construction pro-
cess, such as manufacturers and suppliers of products incorporated into the
realty, can marshal a creditable argument that they may assert the limitation
period contained in section 12-310, even though this result was not specifi-
cally contemplated by Congress. Thus, for example, section 12-3 10 may op-
erate to deprive a person of a cause of action against a manufacturer or
supplier of a defective product that forms part of the realty. In this event,
the party may be relegated to the remedies, if any, he or she may possess
against the owner of the realty.7
This article addresses the issues raised, but largely unanswered, by the
language of section 12-3 10 and the legislative history accompanying the stat-
ute's enactment. Part I of this article provides an overview of the statute and
examines the one reported decision from the United States District Court for
Maryland in which a court has found occasion to examine the statute's
parameters.
Part II of this article discusses an essential prerequisite to the application
of section 12-310. By its terms, section 12-310 bars certain actions arising
from an "improvement to real property," a phrase undefined in the statute.
Courts from other jurisdictions have developed two principal tests to deter-
mine whether an object constitutes an improvement to real property subject
Limitation of Action]; Comment, Recent Statutory Development Concerning the Limitations of
Actions Against Architects Engineers and Builders, 60 Ky. L.J. 462 (1972); Comment, Defective
Design-Wisconsin's Limitation of Action Statute for Architects, Contractors and Others In-
volved in Design and Improvements to Real Property, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 87 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Defective Design]; Comment, A Defense Catalog for the Design Professional,
45 UMKC L. REV. 75 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A Defense Catalog]; Note, Actions Arising
Out of Improvements to Real Property: Special Statutes of Limitations, 57 N.D.L. REV. 43
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Improvements to Real Property]; Note, Legislation: Oklahoma's
Statute Limiting Actions Against Designers and Builders of Improvements to Real Property, 27
OKLA. L. REV. 723 (1974).
7. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310(b)(2) (1981 & Supp. 1985) specifically exempts from the
statute's operation actions against "[t]he person who, at the time of the defective or unsafe
condition of the improvement to real property caused injury or death, was the owner of or in
actual possession or control of such real property."
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to the respective state's statute. These tests are discussed in Part II of this
article.
Following a discussion of the improvements that may be subject to section
12-310, Parts III through V examine the persons who properly may invoke
the time limitation set forth in the statute, as well as the effect of the statute
on a plaintiff's cause of action and on a defendant's right to contribution or
indemnity. A thesis of this article is that persons other than architects and
construction professionals, the principal classes of protected persons envi-
sioned by Congress, may raise the defense provided by section 12-310 as the
statute is presently drafted.
Although the preclusive effect of section 12-310 may extend to situations
not specifically contemplated by Congress, several reasons argue in favor of
limiting the statute's applicability to claims against architects and other per-
sons directly involved in the construction process. Part VI of this article
discusses these reasons and proposes certain amendments to the present stat-
utory language.
Finally, section 12-310 poses substantial constitutional questions. The
statute in its present form, or as amended to specifically limit its applicabil-
ity, distinguishes among potential classes of defendants, relieving some from
liability while allowing actions to proceed against others. Further, section
12-310 may operate to extinguish a person's right of recovery before the
person has suffered a loss that otherwise might be compensable, or at a time
that deprives the person of a reasonable period of time within which to bring
suit. The classification scheme inherent to section 12-310, and the poten-
tially draconian effects of its application, open the statute to constitutional
attack. These constitutional concerns are examined in the last Part of this
article.
I. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 12-310
Traditionally, the liability of architects and other members of the con-
struction industry has been narrowly circumscribed. Early American
courts, following English precedent, required privity of contract before im-
posing liability on an architect. Absent a contractual relationship between
the architect and the person seeking relief, there existed no remedy for the
actions of the architect.8
8. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), is often cited as
the progenitor of cases requiring privity of contract before liability can attach. See F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.5 (1956 & Supp. 1968); see also Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d
253 (D.C. Cir. 1926). Ford subsequently was overruled in Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956).
The liability of architects and builders under American and English common law was a
1985]
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The liability of builders to third parties was similarly limited by the so-
called "completed and accepted" doctrine. This doctrine, closely related to
the architects' privity defense, 9 extinguished a builder's liability to third par-
ties once the builder completed the structure and the owner accepted it.'
The erosion of the privity defense initiated in the products liability arena
by MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. " slowly infiltrated to actions against ar-
chitects and builders. In Hanna v. Fletcher 2 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, expressly relying on MacPher-
son,13 abandoned the privity requirement in an action against a building con-
tractor. Courts in other jurisdictions likewise have eliminated the privity
and completed-and-accepted defenses in actions against architects, builders,
and others involved in the construction process.14
Rejection of these traditional defenses exposed members of the construc-
tion industry to potential liability of indefinite duration. Actions could be
brought against the architect and builder many years after construction of
the project was completed and accepted, at a time when exculpatory evi-
dence essential to the defense no longer was available. The passage of time
also made it increasingly likely that damages allegedly attributable to defec-
tive design or construction were, in fact, caused by the owner's negligent
maintenance of the premises. '"
departure from the liability of these parties under civil law. The Romans, following a tradition
dating from the Babylonian civilization, imposed strict liability upon these parties. See W.
PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 104 (4th ed. 1971); Bell, Professional Negli-
gence ofArchitects and Engineers, 12 VAND. L. REV. 711 (1959); Brown, Building Contractors'
Liability After Completion and Acceptance, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 193 (1976); Collins, supra
note 6, at 41-42; Sisson & Kelly, supra note 6, at 243; Comment, A Defense Catalog, supra note
6, at 75; Note, Improvements to Real Property, supra note 6, at 43; Note, The Crumbling Tower
ofArchitectural Immunity: Evolution and Expansion of the Liability to Third Parties, 45 OHIO
ST. L.J. 217 (1984) [hereinafter cited as The Crumbling Tower ofArchitectural Immunity]. See
also J. ACRET, ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS, § 9.02 (2d ed. 1984); Annot. 97, A.L.R.3d 455
(1980); Annot. 59, A.L.R.3d 869 (1974).
9. See generally J. ACRET, supra note 8, at § 9.06. See also Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d
469, 472 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956).
10. See generally J. ACRET, supra note 8, at § 9.06; see also authorities cited supra note 8.
11. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In MacPherson, the New York Court of Ap-
peals abrogated the privity defense and allowed the ultimate user of an automobile to maintain
a negligence action against the automobile manufacturer.
12. 231 F.2d 469, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956).
13. Id. at 473.
14. See, e.g., McDonough v. Whalen, 365 Mass. 506, 313 N.E.2d 435 (1974); Totten v.
Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968); Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137,
143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 385
(1965) (contractor liable for physical harm resulting from dangerous condition of the structure
under same rules as those applying to manufacturer of chattel). See generally J. ACRET, supra
note 8, at §§ 9.04, 9.06.
15. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1274, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).
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It is against this backdrop that various state legislatures enacted archi-
tects' and builders' statutes of repose to establish an outer time limit beyond
which architects, builders, and other members of the construction industry
could not be held liable for design and construction defects. These statutes
differ in various respects, including the time within which actions must be
commenced, 16 the persons protected,17 the types of actions barred,"8 and the
grace period allowed for causes of action accruing near the expiration of the
16. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-218 (1975) (seven years); ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055
(1983) (six years); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-237 (Supp. 1983) (five years); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-
1007 (1982) (eight years); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-214 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984) (twelve
years); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20-2 (Burns Supp. 1984) (ten years); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 413.135 (Baldwin 1979) (five years); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (West Supp. 1984) (fifteen
years); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3-201 to 28-3-203 (1980) (four years).
17. Unlike § 12-3 10, the majority of analogous statutes in other jurisdictions provide that
no action may be brought against a specified group of defendants, usually those engaged in the
design and construction of improvements. The Alaska architects' and builders' statute of re-
pose offers a typical illustration: "No action ... may be brought against a person performing
or furnishing the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or construction
of an improvement more than six years after substantial completion of an improvement."
ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (1983). Other states have outlined the class of protected persons in
a similar manner. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-237 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-584(a) (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8127 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 413.135 (Baldwin 1979).
Some states go further and delineate those persons who may raise the defense provided by
the statute. Colorado takes this approach:
All actions against any architect, contractor, builder or builder vendor, engineer,
or inspector performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, inspection,
construction, or observation of construction of any improvement to real property
shall be brought within two years after the claim for relief arises, and not thereafter,
but in no case shall such an action be brought more than ten years after the substan-
tial completion of the improvement to the real property ....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127(l)(a) (Supp. 1981). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
584(a) (West Supp. 1984) (applies to actions against architects and professional engineers);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-A (1964) (applies to actions against architects and engi-
neers duly licensed or registered); MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108(b) (1984)
(applies to actions against architect, professional engineer or contractor).
Most statutes do not address whether manufacturers and other persons in the product's
distributive chain may avail themselves of the protection afforded by the statute. Of the few
statutes that do specify whether manufacturers are among the statutory beneficiaries, the treat-
ment of the manufacturer is divided. Compare HAWAII REV. STAT § 657-8 (1984 Supp.)
(manufacturers of products included within the designated class of beneficiaries); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 541.051 (West Supp. 1984) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-29 (Supp. 1982) (same);
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (Supp. 1984) (same) with VA. CODE § 8.01-250 (1984) (manufacturers
and suppliers excluded). Most statutes also exempt actions against owners of the realty from
the statute's operation. But see HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-8 (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 541.051 (West Supp. 1984).
18. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (1983) (no action in contract, tort, or otherwise
may be brought after statutory time period); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584(a) (West
Supp. 1984) (same); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260 § 2B (West Supp. 1985) (applies only to tort
claims); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-223 (1979) (applies only to warranty claims).
1985]
Catholic University Law Review
time limit established by the statute. 9
Section 12-310 applies to actions for personal injury, injury to real or per-
sonal property, and wrongful death resulting from a defective or unsafe con-
dition of an improvement to real property. The statute bars all such actions
unless the injury or death occurs within ten years from the date the improve-
ment was "substantially completed."2 ° Substantial completion is deemed to
occur when the improvement to real property is first used or when it is first
available for use upon completion according to the contract or agreement
covering the improvement, whichever occurs first.2' The statute also pre-
cludes any action for contribution or indemnity that is brought as a result of
any injury or death not occurring within this ten-year period.
22
Section 12-310 is inapplicable in two specified situations. First, actions
based on an express or implied contract are exempt from the statute's opera-
tion.23 Second, section 12-310 is inapplicable in any action against the
owner or person in actual possession of the real property at the time the
19. For example, the Montana statute provides that no action may be commenced more
than ten years after completion of the improvement. Nonetheless, the statute provides an
additional year to bring suit for an injury occurring during the tenth year: "Notwithstanding
the provisions of subsection (1), an action for such damages for an injury which occurred
during the 10th year after such completion may be commenced within 1 year after the occur-
rence of such injury." MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 27-2-208(2) (1983). Most architects' and
builders' statutes of repose contain similar grace provisions. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.10.055(b) (1983) (two years); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-239 (Supp. 1983) (one year); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-80-127 (Supp. 1981) (two years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584(a)(b)
(West Supp. 1984) (one year); KY. STAT. ANN. § 413.135(2) (Baldwin 1979) (one year);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (West Supp. 1984) (two years); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 27-
2-208 (1983) (one year); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-44(2) (1974) (two years). The District of
Columbia statute contains no such grace period. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310 (1981 &
Supp. 1985). The absence of such a provision may expose the statute to constitutional attack.
See infra text accompanying notes 202-07.
20. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310(a)(l)(B) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310(b)(1) (1981 & Supp. 1985). Several analogous statutes
from other jurisdictions do not have a "contract" exception, but bar all causes of action both in
tort and contract. See, e.g., CONN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584(a) (West Supp. 1984). Thus, for
example, pursuant to the contract exemption contained in the District of Columbia statute, an
owner's claim against the builder premised upon the builder's breach of contract is not subject
to the 10 year bar. See, e.g., Elizabeth Gamble Deaconess Home Ass'n v. Turner Constr. Co.,
14 Ohio App. 3d 281, 470 N.E.2d 950 (1984) (Ohio statute only applies to tort claims; owner's
claim against architect and builder for breach of contract not within statute); Duncan v.
Schuster-Graham, 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978) (Colorado statute did not apply to
owner's contract claim against builder of house). But see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence,
Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Ohio law)
(distinguishing Duncan, Ohio statute bars suits seeking any type of damages). The continuing
precedential validity of Hartford Fire is subject to question in view of the Ohio appellate
court's decision in Elizabeth Gamble.
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improvement caused the injury or death.24
One troublesome question surrounding section 12-310 is the relationship
between the ten-year period set forth in the statute and the normal statute of
limitations governing a plaintiff's cause of action. Most analogous statutes
of repose enacted in other jurisdictions provide that a cause of action must
be "brought" or "commenced" within a specified period of time after com-
pletion of the improvement if the action is to be deemed timely.2 5 The usual
statute of limitations governing a cause of action operates within this outer
time limit, but does not extend the time to file suit beyond the period set
forth in the statute of repose. Thus, for example, in a jurisdiction having a
three-year tort statute of limitations as well as an architects' and builders'
statute of repose requiring all actions to be commenced within ten years after
completion of the improvement, a person injured in the sixth year after com-
pletion is subject to the normal statute of limitations and has three years to
file suit. On the other hand, a person injured on the 364th day of the ninth
year following completion of the improvement has only one day within
which to commence an action.2 6
Unlike statutes in other jurisdictions, section 12-310 does not specifically
provide that actions within the statute's scope actually must be commenced
within the ten-year period set forth in the statute. Nor does section 12-310
set forth its relationship with the various District of Columbia statutes of
limitation. Rather, the focal point of section 12-310 is the relationship be-
tween the date of injury or death and substantial completion of the improve-
ment. The statute provides that certain specified actions are barred unless
the injury or death forming the basis of the action occurs within ten years of
substantial completion of the improvement. The statute does not state, how-
ever, that all actions must be commenced within this ten-year period if the
injury or death occurs within this time frame.
Although the language of section 12-310 leaves in doubt whether a party
24. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310(b)(2) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
25. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-237 (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127
(Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584(a) (West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-4-20-2 (Burns Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-A (1964); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 516.097 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 27-2-208 (1983). Many
statutes also provide that the time period established by the statute does not extend the specific
statute of limitations applicable to the claim. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055(c) (1983);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584a(d) (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-53 (1982);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.135(3) (Baldwin 1979). The Idaho statute is typical in this re-
gard: "Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed by the
laws of this state for the bringing of any action." See IDAHO CODE § 5-241 (1979).
26. Several jurisdictions have ameliorated this harsh result by providing a "grace period"
during which a person may bring an action for injury or death occurring near the expiration of
the time period established by the statute of repose. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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actually must commence an action within the ten-year period established by
the statute, the legislative history of the statute answers this question in the
affirmative. The Senate Report specifically states that an action within the
purview of the statute must be commenced within ten years of substantial
completion of the improvement: "Thus, actions for damages, contribution
or indemnity against design professionals must be brought within 10 years
from the date the improvement to real property was substantially completed.
Actions not commenced within the 10 year period are completely barred
from being brought."2 7
The effect of section 12-310 is to completely extinguish a party's cause of
action ten years after substantial completion of the improvement. The nor-
mal statute of limitations operates within this ten-year period, but does not
allow a person to bring suit' beyond the time limit established by section 12-
310.28
The one reported decision discussing the application of section 12-310,
President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Madden,29 examines several
issues raised by the statute, including the relationship of section 12-310 to
the statutes of limitation normally governing a plaintiff's cause of action. In
President and Directors, the plaintiff instituted a diversity action against the
architects, structural engineers, general contractors, masonry subcontrac-
tors, and surety involved in the construction of a Georgetown University
dormitory. The dormitory first was used in 1964, and plaintiff filed the law-
suit in 1977. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the architects negligently
planned and supervised the construction of the building. In addition, plain-
tiff asserted sundry tort and contract claims against the various defendants.
Several of the defendants, including the architects, engineers, and general
contractor, moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff's action
was barred by section 12-310. The court held section 12-310 precluded
plaintiff's tort claims.30 Further, while plaintiff's contract claims against
27. S. REP. No. 1274, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972). See also 118 CONG. REC. 36,939
(1972).
28. Several courts have interpreted their respective state's statutes of repose in this man-
ner. See, e.g., Grissom v. North Am. Aviation, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Fla. 1971) (inter-
preting Florida law); Federal Reserve Bank v. Wright, 392 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(interpreting Virginia law); O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 335 A.2d 545 (1975); Smith v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 38 N.C. App. 457, 248 S.E.2d 462, cert. de-
nied, 296 N.C. 586, 254 S.E.2d 33 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, Love v. Moore, 205 N.C.
575, 291 S.E.2d 141 (1982); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382
A.2d 715 (1978); Comptroller of Va. ex rel. Virginia Military Inst. v. King, 217 Va. 751, 232
S.E.2d 895 (1977). See also Note, Improvements to Real Property, supra note 6, at 55.
29. 505 F. Supp 575, afj'd in part and appeal dismissed in part, 660 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.
1981).
30. Id. at 575.
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the general contractor were within the exception of section 12-310(b)(1),
they nonetheless were time-barred by application of the normal District of
Columbia statute of limitations pertaining to these claims. 1
In reaching its conclusions, the court in President and Directors addresses
several difficult issues. In an effort to avoid the preclusive effect of section
12-310, plaintiff attempted to invoke the "discovery rule" by characterizing
its action as based on "professional malpractice."'32 Since the injury was not
discovered until September 1976, plaintiff argued, the running of the limita-
tions period was tolled until this time.33 The court rejected this argument,
noting that plaintiff's interpretation would render the statute a nullity.34
Although the court properly refused application of the discovery rule to
toll the operation of section 12-310, the court's analysis of the relationship
between section 12-310 and District of Columbia statutes of limitations is
less satisfactory. Relying on the legislative history accompanying a 1967
version of the statute,35 as well as the analogous Maryland statute of re-
31. Id. at 581.
32. Id. at 575.
33. Id.
34. The answer, however, is that if the mere incorporation of a defect constitutes an
injury for which plaintiff need not claim within the time limits of section 12-3 10, even
though the resulting damage is not discovered until many years after the ten-year
period in section 12-310 has run, then the whole purpose of section 12-310 and simi-
lar statutes-to provide builders and design professionals with a finite period of risk
for any one project-would be vitiated.
President & Directors, 505 F. Supp. at 575-76. See also Hudesman v. Meriwether Leachman
Assocs., 35 Wash. App. 318, 666 P.2d 937 (1983) (Washington statute of repose for architects
and builders restricts application of discovery rule); Hooper Water Improvement Dist. v.
Reeve, 642 P.2d 745 (Utah 1982) (discovery rule inapplicable).
35. President & Directors, 505 F. Supp. at 572-73. In 1967, Congress considered a bill,
H.R. 6527, nearly identical to § 12-310 with the exception that this earlier bill established a 5-
year rather than a 10-year period in which the injury or death must occur if an action was to
be considered timely. H.R. 6527, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 28,157 (1967). This
proposed legislation passed the House of Representatives, but did not receive Senate approval.
See 113 CONG. REc. 28,157 (1967). An identical bill, H.R. 4181, was reintroduced in the
House of Representatives during the 91st Congress. H.R. 4181, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REC. 19,332 (1969). See also H.R. REP. No. 370, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969).
Again, the bill passed the House, but not the Senate. See 115 CoNG. REc. 19,333 (1969).
The legislative history of H.R. 6527, cited by the court in President and Directors, suggested
that the bill would have no effect on the normal statute of limitations governing a plaintiff's
cause of action:
The effect of this amendment is that if a cause of action accrues at any time up to and
including the last day of the 5 year period from the date the improvement was sub-
stantially completed [10 years in the later version § 12-310], an action in damages for
injury to real or personal property could be filed within 3 years (D.C. Code, sec. 12-
301(3)); in the case of personal injury an action could be filed within 3 years (D.C.
Code, sec. 12-301(8)); and in the case of wrongful death, an action could be filed
within 1 year (D.C. Code, sec. 16-2702).
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pose,36 the court observed that section 12-310 does not abrogate the normal
statute of limitations governing a plaintiff's cause of action.3' Rather, if an
injury or death occurs within the ten-year period set forth in section 12-310,
an action must be commenced within the normal limitation period relating
to plaintiff's claim. A person injured in the ninth year following substantial
completion of the improvement, for example, would have three additional
years to institute an action under the normal District of Columbia statute of
limitations, even though the effect of this interpretation is to extend the ten-
year period contained in section 12-3 10.31
The court's holding concerning the interaction of section 12-310 and the
District of Columbia statutes of limitations is correct insofar as it concerns
claims arising at a time when the normal statute of limitations governing the
claim does not operate to extend the time to file suit beyond the period estab-
lished by section 12-310. For example, a person whose tort action accrues
during the fifth year following substantial completion has three years to file
an action.39 Where the court errs, however, is in concluding that the normal
statute of limitations may allow a party to file suit outside the ten-year pe-
riod specified in section 12-310. This result is contrary to the legislative his-
tory accompanying section 12-310. Regardless of what the proponents of
the 1967 version of the statute intended, the drafters of the 1972 statute
clearly contemplated that an action within the ambit of section 12-310 be
commenced within the ten-year period specified in the statute.' The iso-
lated comments of a proponent of an earlier version of section 12-310 do not
support the conclusion that the District of Columbia statute of limitations
may extend the time period embodied in section 12-310.4 ' Nor does the
113 CONG. REC. 28,158 (1967). Thus, according to the interpretation of the drafters of the
1967 version of § 12-310, the claim of a person who suffered an injury on the last day of the
ninth anniversary following substantial completion of the improvement, would be governed by
the normal statute of limitations. In effect, this person could file suit after the 10 year period
set forth in § 12-310 expired.
36. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 5-108 (1984).
37. President & Directors, 505 F. Supp. at 572-73. "Under Maryland or District of Co-
lumbia law, if a cause of action arises on the 364th day of the ninth year, the injured party still
has the normal three year limitations period in which to file suit." Id. at 575.
38. Id.
39. The District of Columbia has a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury.
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(3) (1981 & Supp. 1985). A one-year statute of limitations
applies to wrongful death actions. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2702 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
40. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
41. The court in President & Directors relies on the fact that the 1967 legislative history
was cited to during the passage of § 12-310. President & Directors, 505 F. Supp. at 472 n.26.
Yet it seems unlikely this bare reference can override the legislative history of the 1972 statute
which unambiguously indicates that all actions must be brought within 10 years of substantial
completion if they are to be deemed timely. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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analogous Maryland statute lend support to the court's conclusion. 2 The
interpretation of section 12-310 most consistent with the legislative history
and purpose of the statute requires that all actions subject to the statute must
be instituted within ten years of substantial completion of the
improvement.43
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY
A necessary prerequisite to the application of section 12-310 is a determi-
nation that a party's damages are attributable to an "improvement to real
property." This phrase is not defined in the statute;44 rather, construction of
this operative language is left for judicial interpretation.45
Interpreting similar statutory language, courts from other jurisdictions
42. The Maryland statute provides that a cause of action against an architect and profes-
sional engineer does not "accrue" if the injury or death forming the basis of the action occurs
more than 10 years after the improvement first becomes available for its intendeu use. See MD.
Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108(b) (1984). In 1979, the Maryland statute was
amended to include a provision requiring an action to be filed within three years after accrual.
See MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108(c) (1984). Thus, so long as the cause of
action accrues within the 10-year time period established by the Maryland statute, an action
may be filed within three years thereafter even though this may allow an action to be filed after
the expiration of the 10-year accrual period. This is in stark contrast to the Senate Report
accompanying § 12-310, which specifically states that the statute requires all actions within its
ambit, must be commenced within 10 years of substantial completion of the improvement. See
supra note 27 and accompanying text. Even prior to the 1979 amendment, the legislative
history of the Maryland statute strongly suggested that the normal statute of limitations ap-
plied to actions subject to the architects' and builders' statute of repose. See President & Direc-
tors, 505 F. Supp. at 571.
43. Recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held the discovery rule applica-
ble to a tort and contract action alleging the deficient design and construction of an addition to
a house. See Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Prue, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192 (D.C. 1984). The facts of
Ehrenhaft, however, did not implicate § 12-310; only five years had elapsed between the com-
pletion of the addition and commencement of the suit. Id. at 1194-95. Moreover, the court
specifically declined to address "[w]hat impact, if any, D.C. CODE § 12-310 (1981 & Supp.
1985) may have upon a suit alleging claims in both tort and contract." Id. at 1201 n. 14.
44. The District of Columbia statute is not alone in this regard. Only one state has statu-
torily defined "improvement" to real property for purposes of its architects' and builders' stat-
ute of repose. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8127 (1974).
45. Structural improvements to the realty, such as a building, are obviously within the
ambit of the statute, as demonstrated by both the legislative history of § 12-310, see, e.g., S.
REP. No. 1274, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972), and the statutory language. Section 12-
310(a)(2)(b) defines one of the two circumstances constituting substantial completion as the
time when the improvement is "[c]ompleted in accordance with the contract or agreement
covering the improvement, including any agreed changes to the contract or agreement,"
clearly contemplating the completion of structural improvements to the realty. But improve-
ments subject to the statute are not limited to buildings or structural improvements. In dis-
cussing the various beneficiaries of the statute, the legislative history speaks of "architects who
design buildings or improvements to real property, [and] engineers who design and install
equipment..." S. REP. No. 1274, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972) (emphasis added). Thus,
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have adopted two somewhat overlapping tests to determine whether a partic-
ular object qualifies as an improvement. A small minority of courts have
relied upon common law fixture analysis.46 Pursuant to this approach, an
object that qualifies as a fixture also is deemed to be an improvement to real
property subject to the architects' and builders' statute of repose.
The overwhelming majority of courts, however, have eschewed a rigid fix-
ture analysis and have applied a "common sense" or "common usage" test.
47
The relevant inquiry in this test centers upon whether the object is an "im-
provement" pursuant to the common usage or literal meaning of that term.
Courts often cite dictionary definitions of "improvement" to support their
determinations of whether the object in issue qualifies as such.48
Improvements within the meaning of statutes of repose such as section 12-
310 have not been limited to buildings constructed on real property, but
include items that make the real property more useful or valuable, or form
an integral part of the overall structure. Thus, a sprinkler system,49 swim-
ming pool,5° furnace,51 refrigeration system,52 street pavement,53 electrical
improvements within the parameters of § 12-310 are not limited to buildings or even structural
improvements, but include other items such as "equipment" located on the realty.
46. See Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1974); Wiggins v. Proc-
tor & Schwartz, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1971), afld per curiam, Civil No. 71-1952
(4th Cir. Mar. 8, 1972) (unpublished).
47. See, e.g., Adair v. Koppers Co., 541 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1982), affid, 741 F.2d
111 (6th Cir. 1984); Cudahy Co. v. Ragnar Benson, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1981);
McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co. 494 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Colo. 1980); Mullis v. Southern
Co. Servs., 250 Ga. 90, 296 S.E.2d 579 (1982); Allentown Plaza Assocs. v. Suburban Propane
Gas Corp., 43 Md. App. 337, 405 A.2d 326 (1979); Milligan v. Tibbetts Eng'g Corp., 391
Mass. 364, 461 N.E.2d 808 (1984) (not expressly adopting test but employing dictionary defini-
tion of "improvement"); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548
(Minn. 1977); Mora-San Miguel Elec. Coop. v. Hicks & Ragland Consulting & Eng'g Co., 93
N.M. 175, 598 P.2d 218 (1979); Jones v. Ohio Bldg. Co., 4 Ohio Misc. 2d 10, 447 N.E.2d 776
(1982); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).
48. A typical definition of an "improvement" is cited in Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square
D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975). There, the court held that an interior sprin-
kler system in a building was an "improvement to real property" pursuant to the Wisconsin
statute precluding actions against architects, engineers, and designers. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court referred to the definition appearing in WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY (3d ed.): "[A] permanent addition to or betterment of real property that enhances its
capital value and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make the
property more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordinary repairs." 66 Wis. 2d at 386,
225 N.W.2d at 456-57. Decisions from other courts have cited Kallas with approval and have
employed the same or similar definitions of "improvement." See, e.g., Adair v. Kroppers Co.,
741 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1984); McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334 (D.
Colo. 1980); Allentown Plaza Assocs. v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 43 Md. App. 337, 405
A.2d 326 (1979); Jones v. Ohio Bldg. Co., 4 Ohio Misc. 2d 10, 447 N.E.2d 776 (1982).
49. Kalas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).
50. Nevada Lakeshore Co. v. Diamond Elec., Inc., 89 Nev. 293, 511 P.2d 113 (1973).
51. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977).
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transfer switch cabinet,54 coal handling conveyor system, 5 oil refinery
equipment, 6 and an underground pipe57 have been held to be improvements
to real property.58
Although the benchmark of the common sense approach is the literal
52. Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d
528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972) (en banc). See Cudahy Co. v. Ragnar Benson, Inc., 514 F. Supp.
1212 (D. Colo. 1981).
53. Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
54. Brown v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 163 N.J. Super. 179, 394 A.2d 397 (1978),
cert. denied, 79 N.J. 489, 401 A.2d 244 (1979).
55. Adair v. Koppers Co., 541 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1982), affid, 741 F.2d 111 (6th
Cir. 1984).
56. McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Colo. 1980)
57. Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1983).
58. Other objects have been found to constitute improvements subject to architects' and
builders' statutes of repose. See, e.g., Cournoyer v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 744 F.2d 208
(1st Cir. 1984) (prefabricated steel building); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207
(6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983) (electrical wiring); Montaup Elec. Co. v.
Ohio Brass Corp., 561 F. Supp. 740 (D.R.I. 1983) (electrical transmission line); KSLA-TV,
Inc., Radio Corp. of America, 591 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. La. 1980), affid in pertinent part, 693
F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1982) (television transmission tower); Kozikowski v. Delaware River Port
Auth., 397 F. Supp. 1115 (D.N.J. 1975) (bridge); Wiggins v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 330 F.
Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1971), affidper curiam, Civil No. 71-1952 (4th Cir. Mar. 8, 1972) (unpub-
lished) (machine affixed to concrete foundation); Stanske v. Wazee Elec. Co., 690 P.2d 1291
(1982) (indicator light that was part of the electrical system); Mullis v. Southern Co. Servs.,
250 Ga. 90, 296 S.E.2d 579 (1982) (electrical system); Milligan v. Tibbetts Eng'g Corp., 391
Mass. 364, 461 N.E.2d 808 (1984) (road); O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal Consulting Eng'g, 410
Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980) (highway); Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr.,
Inc., 402 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 1981) (glass door); Wayne Township Bd. of Educ. v. Strand Cen-
tury, Inc., 172 N.J. Super. 296, 411 A.2d 1161 (1980) (dimmer panel); Commonwealth Land
Title Ins. Co. v. Topping, 167 N.J. Super. 392, 400 A.2d 1208, cert. denied, 81 N.J. 285, 405
A.2d 830 (1979) (land surveys); Richards v. Union Bldg. & Constr. Corp., 130 N.J. Super. 127,
325 A.2d 831 (1974) (road); Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 645
P.2d 1375 (1982) (road); Mora-San Miguel Elec. Coop. v. Hicks & Ragland Consulting &
Eng'g Co., 93 N.M. 175, 598 P.2d 218 (1979) (power line); Jones v. Ohio Bldg. Co., 4 Ohio
Misc. 2d 10, 447 N.E.2d 776 (1982) (elevator); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co.,
476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978) (freezer insulation material); Mitchell v. United Elevator
Co., 290 Pa. Super. 476, 434 A.2d 1243 (1981) (elevator); Keeler v. Commonwealth, 56 Pa.
Commw. 236, 424 A.2d 614 (1981) (highway guardrails, lights, signs, and directional signals);
Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870 (Tex Civ. App. 1981) (writ ref'd n.r.e), appeal
dismissed, 459 U.S. 802, reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 1059 (1982) (elevator); Highsmith v. J.C. Pen-
ney & Co., 39 Wash. App. 57, 691 P.2d 976 (1984) (escalator); Washington Natural Gas Co. v.
Tyee Constr. Co., 26 Wash. App. 235, 611 P.2d 1378 (1980) (power lines); Pinneo v. Stevens
Pass, Inc., 14 Wash. App. 848, 545 P.2d 1207 (1976) (ski lift).
Other objects have been held not to constitute improvements. See, e.g., Patraka v. Armco
Steel Co., 495 F. Supp. 1013 (MD. Pa. 1980) (subbase of highway); Ciancio v. Serafini, 40
Colo. App. 168, 574 P.2d 876 (1977) (survey); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. City of Atlanta, 160
Ga. App. 396, 287 S.E.2d 229 (1981) (underground gas line); Turner v. Marable-Pirkle, Inc.,
238 Ga. 517, 233 S.E.2d 773, appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 808 (1977) (electric utility pole);
Allentown Plaza Assocs. v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 43 Md. App. 337, 405 A.2d 326
(1979) (gas meters and coupling device); Raffel v. Perley, 14 Mass. App. 252, 437 N.E.2d 1082
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meaning of the term "improvement," vestiges of common law fixture analy-
sis also may influence the court's analysis. Courts ostensibly applying the
common sense approach nonetheless have cited traditional fixture considera-
tions, such as the degree of annexation and physical size of the object, to
buttress their conclusions.59 Yet considerations relevant to the law of fix-
tures rightfully have been cited as merely probative, and not dispositive, of
whether a particular object constitutes an improvement.60
A test based upon the vagaries of the law of fixtures has dubious value and
unnecessarily requires a court to engage in almost metaphysical inquiries
concerning the degree of annexation and intent of the annexor. Freed from
the constraints imposed by the law of fixtures, the common sense approach
provides a flexible analytical framework that can accommodate the facts of a
particular situation. The flexibility offered by the common sense test, how-
ever, is also the test's principal weakness because added flexibility inevitably
leads to decreased predictive value. It is possible, and perhaps probable, that
different courts considering similar fact patterns and using the common
sense test may reach opposite conclusions concerning whether a particular
object is an improvement to real property. 6' Nevertheless, this lack of pre-
dictive value is equally apparent to common law fixture analysis and pro-
vides little basis to wed courts to complex and confusing fixture
considerations. Writing on a clean slate as they are, District of Columbia
courts should adopt the common sense test in distinguishing an "improve-
ment to real property" under section 12-3 10.62
(1982) (survey); E.A. Williams, Inc. v. Russo Dev., 82 N.J. 160, 411 A.2d 697 (1980) (survey);
Ilich v. John E. Smith Sons Co., 145 N.J. Super. 415, 367 A.2d 1216 (1976) (machine wiring).
59. See, e.g., McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1341 (D. Colo.
1980); Allentown Plaza Assocs. v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 43 Md. App. at 345-47, 405
A.2d at 331-32; Brown v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 163 N.J. Super. 179, 192, 394
A.2d 397, 403 (1978), cert. denied, 79 N.J. 489, 401 A.2d 244 (1979).
60. See, e.g., Cudahy Co. v. Ragnar Benson, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1212, 1215 (D. Colo.
1981) ("case law regarding fixtures may be relevant by analogy"). Accord Adair v. Koppers
Co., 541 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (N.D. Ohio 1982), affid, 741 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1984). See also
Jones v. Ohio Bldg. Co., 4 Ohio Misc. 2d 10, 447 N.E.2d 776 (1982) (all fixtures improvements
but all improvements not necessarily fixtures); Keeler v. Commonwealth, 56 Pa. Commw. 236,
424 A.2d 614, 616 (1981) (same); Pinneo v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 14 Wash. App. 848, 545 P.2d
1207 (1976) (not all "improvements" are necessarily fixtures; "improvement" has broader
meaning than "fixtures").
61. Compare Montaup Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Corp., 561 F. Supp. 740 (D.R.I. 1983)
(electrical transmission line an improvement) with Allentown Plaza Assocs. v. Suburban Pro-
pane Gas Corp., 43 Md. App. 337, 405 A.2d 326 (1979) (gas meters and coupling device not an
improvement).
62. At least one other commentator also suggests that courts adopt a common-sense inter-
pretation of "improvement to real property" because of the flexibility that approach affords.
See Note, Improvements to Real Property, supra note 6, at 47.
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III. POTENTIAL DEFENDANTS WITHIN THE PARAMETERS
OF SECTION 12-310
The absence of a definition of "improvement to real property" is not the
only omission of section 12-310 in its present form. Unlike similar statutes
in other jurisdictions,63 section 12-310 fails to specify the class of defendants
who may assert the ten-year limitations period contained in the statute. On
its face, section 12-310 precludes "any action" if the other prerequisites of
the section are satisfied. Pursuant to a literal interpretation of section 12-
310, manufacturers, suppliers and other potential defendants may argue per-
suasively that they fall within the ambit of the statute. Consequently, these
potential defendants may raise the statute as a defense if they are sued in
connection with defective or unsafe improvements to real property.
In describing the need for section 12-310, Congress emphasized the goal of
protecting architects, engineers, contractors, and other members of the con-
struction industry from potential claims made many years after an improve-
ment was completed.'M However, while the legislative history accompanying
section 12-310 evidences an intention to protect these design professionals
from the threat of indefinite liability, the language of section 12-310 contains
no such limitation. Rather, the section is drafted in a manner that precludes
any action after a specified time period; the class protected by the statute is
nowhere expressed.65
63. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
64. Architects who design buildings or improvements to real property, engineers
who design and install equipment, or contractors who build the improvements under
rigid inspection and conformity with building codes, may find themselves named as
defendants in such damage suits 20 years after the improvement was completed and
occupied.
Moreover, architects, engineers, and contractors have no control over an owner
whose neglect in maintaining an improvement may cause dangerous or unsafe condi-
tions to develop over a period of years. They cannot prevent an owner from using an
improvement for purposes for which it was not designed. Nor can they prevent the
owner of a building from making alterations or changes that years later, may be
determined unsafe or defective and appear to be a part of the original improvement.
It cannot be doubted that to allow actions without regard to a reasonable time limita-
tion imposes a difficult evidentiary burden on design professionals and their proge-
nies. This proposed legislation strikes the balance between the rights of injured
parties to seek recovery on the one hand, and the substantial interests of the design
professionals to have work finality on the other.
S. REP. No. 1274, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).
65. The specific statutory language of § 12-310 precludes "any action" if the other re-
quirements of the statute are satisfied. The statute expressly excludes from its operation only
two classes of potential defendants-the owner of the realty and person in actual possession of
the realty when the injury or death occurred. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310(b)(2) (1981 &
Supp. 1985). It cannot be argued that this language is in any manner ambiguous; the statute
contains a blanket prohibition of "any action" against any defendant except those persons
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Several courts have discussed the class of persons protected by statutes of
specifically identified in § 12-310(b)(2). Cf Kalmbach, Inc. v. Insurance Co., 529 F.2d 552,
556 (9th Cir. 1976) (word "any" had comprehensive meaning of "all or every"). Thus, a court
has no occasion to look to the legislative history to discern an intent not reflected in the plain
language of the statute. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States Enviromental Protection
Agency, 635 F.2d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1980) ("It is ... a cardinal rule of statutory interpreta-
tion that courts do not turn to legislative history to shed light on the meaning of easily under-
standable and unambiguous statutory enactments."). See also United States v. Young, 376
A.2d 809, 813 (D.C. 1977); United States v. Stokes, 365 A.2d 615, 618 (D.C. 1976). Of course,
even if the legislative history is consulted, this history does not specifically state the statute is
for the sole benefit of architects, engineers, and other classes specifically mentioned. The Sen-
ate Report indicates that "[d]esign professionals include, inter alia, architects, engineers, con-
tractors, and builders." S. REP. No. 1274, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972). See also Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Business, Commerce, and Judiciary of the Comm. on the District of
Columbia, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972) (statement of Ted D. Kuem-
merling, Office of the Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia) ("The effect of S. 1524 is to
insulate from liability such persons as engineers, architects, designers, contractors, builders,
and others .... "). The use of the phrase "inter alia" evinces an intent not to provide an
exclusive list of protected parties, but to merely provide examples of included parties. Cf
Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. ICC, 645 F.2d 1102, 1112 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(word "including" is illustrative, not exclusive). In addition, merely because these classes are
identified in the legislative history does not support an inference that actions against these
persons are the only ones precluded by the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 591 (1981) (one stated purpose of statute cannot be read negatively as sole purpose);
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341 (1981) ("Congress cannot be expected to specifi-
cally address each issue of statutory construction which may arise."); United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 482 F.2d 439, 444 (7th Cir. 1973) ("[tlhe plainer the language [of the stat-
ute], the more convincing contrary legislative history must be."). It is not a court's function to
reject a claim because it believes the legislature meant something different than the statutory
language specifies. See, e.g., Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 53 U.S.L.W. 5034, 5038 n.13 (U.S.
June 25, 1985) ("Congress' 'inklings' [of statute's application] are best determined by the statu-
tory language it chooses . . . . Congressional silence [in legislative history], no matter how
'clanging,' cannot override the words of the statute."); Harrison v. PPG Industries, 446 U.S.
578, 592 (1980) ("In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of
Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark."); Doski v. Goldseker Co.,
539 F.2d 1326, 1332 (4th Cir. 1976) (citing United States v. Deluxe Cleaners & Laundry, Inc.,
511 F.2d 926, 929 (4th Cir. 1975) (court may not construe a statute on the "[m]ere surmise as
to what the Legislature intended and to assume that it was only by inadvertence that it failed
to state something other than what it plainly stated."). See also United States v. Young, 376
A.2d 809, 813 (D.C. 1977).
Finally, the express exclusion of owners and persons in possession of the realty in § 12-
310(b)(2) supports the inference that all other persons are not excepted and may raise the time
bar set forth in the statute. See generally 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 47.23 (4th ed. 1973) ("The enumeration of exclusions from the operation of the
statute indicates that it should apply to all cases not specifically excluded."). Although this
doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is subject to some limitations, it nonetheless
remains one of the general rules of statutory construction. Id. See also Andrus v. Glover
Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) ("Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain ex-
ceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of
evidence of a contrary legislative intent."); Sanker v. United States, 374 A.2d 304, 309 (D.C.
1977) ("Although the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a rule of construction
which is to be applied with caution, it still is entitled to some weight.").
Architects' and Builders' Statute of Repose
repose analogous to section 12-310. These courts have grappled with the
difficult issue of whether persons not directly involved in the construction
process, such as manufacturers of equipment incorporated into the realty,
are afforded protection by these statutes of repose. The decisions rendered
on this issue are divided. A majority of courts have narrowly construed the
class of protected persons and have denied protection to manufacturers and
other persons whose goods or services are only incidental to construction.
Other courts, often guided by a more literal reading of the applicable statute,
have allowed these more remote participants in the construction process to
raise the statute as a defense.
In Brown v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.,66 one of a series of New
Jersey decisions outlining the beneficiaries of that state's architects' and
builders' statute of repose, 67 an action was brought against several defend-
ants, including a defense contractor who allegedly participated in the design
and construction of a missile facility where the plaintiff was burned severely.
Plaintiff claimed that his injury was attributable to the improper design and
location of a free-standing, metal, electrical transfer switch assembly cabinet
that housed various electrical components.
The court answered the initial question of whether the cabinet was an
improvement to real property in thc affirmative. The cabinet was eight feet
high, ten feet long, three to four feet deep, and was anchor-bolted to the
floor.68 In addition to its physical size, the cabinet formed an integral part of
the electrical system designed to provide all the power needs of the missile
base where the cabinet was located.69
Turning its attention to the class of persons covered by the New Jersey
statute, the court concluded that the defense contractor was within the pro-
tected class. Furthermore, the court generally outlined those parties who
may raise the defense provided by the statute as follows:
The legislative intent in adopting [the New Jersey statute] . . .
quite obviously was not to limit the exposure of manufacturers and
purveyors of products which are used in the factory, shop or home,
66. 163 N.J. Super. 179, 394 A.2d 397 (1978), cert. denied, 79 N.J. 489, 401 A.2d 244
(1979).
67. An earlier New Jersey decision, Rosenberg v. North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d
662 (1972), held that the class of beneficiaries of that state's statute might extend beyond
architects and engineers, but did not specify the parties who could raise the limitations period
provided by the statute. 293 A.2d at 668. Prior to Brown, the courts of Montana and New
Mexico also refused to interpret their respective state statutes to include manufacturers. See
Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688,
568 P.2d 214, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977).
68. 394 A.2d at 403.
69. Id. at 405.
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or those who service these products. As best we can perceive, the
intent of the language of the statute was to protect those who con-
tribute to the design, planning, supervision or construction of a
structural improvement to real estate and those systems, ordinarily
mechanical systems, such as heating, electrical, plumbing and air
conditioning, which are integrally a normal part of that kind of
improvement, and which are required for the structure to actually
function as intended.70
The precise meaning of Brown is unclear. The court expressly states that
manufacturers of products used in the "factory, shop, or home" are not the
intended beneficiaries of the statute. Nevertheless, the court found that a
different result is required for those who "design" various systems necessary
to the normal function of structural improvements. Unfortunately, the
court did not indicate whether the manufacturers of these integral systems
are "designers" subject to coverage under the statute.71
The dichotomy first suggested in Brown is reiterated in subsequent New
Jersey decisions. In Wayne Township Board of Education v. Strand Century,
Inc. ,72 the plaintiff brought suit against the owner of a subsidiary company
that allegedly participated in the design and manufacture of a defective dim-
mer panel used in a school auditorium. The court observed that those en-
gaged in the design and manufacture of stock or shelf items incorporated
into the structure were not the intended beneficiaries of the New Jersey stat-
ute. Those engaged in the design of integral components, however, were
within the statute's parameters:
If, however, [defendant] merely sold a stock or shelf item out of its
regular inventory or fabricated a product as designed and specified
by the electrical engineer or the electrical contractor for this pro-
ject it was not within the repose of [the New Jersey statute]. We
are satisfied that the Legislature did not intend [the New Jersey
statute] to extend repose to the designers and manufacturers of all
products or suppliers of materials which ultimately found their
way into improvements to real estate. Implication in the design
and planning stage of the improvement to realty itself or of [sic]
integral component thereof, not mere design of a fungible product
70. Id.
71. Part of the confusion inherent in Brown stems from the litigants' failure to clearly
describe the precise role of the defense contractor seeking to invoke the statute. Id. at 402.
The defense contractor's alleged negligence was apparently two-fold. First, the contractor was
charged with "[the installation of the improperly placed ventilating window in the exterior
wall" of the building that contained the electrical transfer switch assembly. Id. at 401. Sec-
ond, the contractor also allegedly participated in the "design, planning, supervision, or con-
struction of the components. . . ." Id. at 403.
72. 172 N.J. Super. 296, 411 A.2d 1161 (1980).
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or fabrication of a product from specifications which product is
later incorporated in the building, is required. 73
While drawing a distinction between those who manufacture fungible
products and those who manufacture integral components of a structure,
Wayne Township, like Brown, does not specify whether the manufacturers of
these integral components are necessarily persons engaged in the "design" of
an improvement to real property within the New Jersey statute. In fact, the
court suggests to the contrary when it observes that "[p]roduct design alone
is not enough to trigger the applicability ' 74 of the statute.
More recently, another New Jersey court has relied upon Brown and
Wayne Township in denying relief to a manufacturer under that state's stat-
ute of repose. In Cinnaminson Township Board of Education v. US. Gypsum
Co.," the manufacturer of acoustical plaster containing asbestos argued that
plaintiff's cause of action was time-barred because the suit was brought more
than ten years after construction of the schools where the acoustical tile was
installed. The court rejected this argument because the defendant played no
role "in the design, planning, supervision or construction of the plaintiff's
schools" or in "the actual installation of the acoustical plaster.",76 Further,
the tile was found to be mere "stock material" that only "incidentally found
its way into plaintiff's schools."' 77 Accordingly, under Brown and Wayne
Township, the statute of repose was held inapplicable.
New Jersey is not the only state that has narrowly interpreted a manufac-
turer's ability to invoke the limitation period embodied in architects' and
builders' statutes of repose. In Condit v. Lewis Refrigeration Co.,78 the
Washington Supreme Court considered whether a defendant, who
"designed, manufactured and installed"' 79 a freezer system that caused plain-
tiff's personal injury, could raise the Washington statute of repose. The de-
fendant claimed that plaintiff's cause of action was time-barred because the
injury occurred after the time limit established by the statute. Relying on
Brown and on the specific language of the Washington statute, the court held
the defendant-manufacturer could not assert the time limitation contained in
the statute as a defense. To rule otherwise, the court observed, would allow
the manufacturer to circumvent products liability law:
Furthermore, if these individuals were protected, they could easily
73. 411 A.2d at 1164 (footnote omitted).
74. Id.
75. 552 F. Supp. 855 (D.N.J. 1982).
76. Id. at 863.
77. Id.
78. 101 Wash. 2d 106, 676 P.2d 466 (1984) (en bane).
79. 676 P.2d at 467.
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avoid product liability law, if they desired, by simply bolting, weld-
ing the equipment or fastening it in some other manner to the
building. Mechanical fastening may attach a machine to the build-
ing, but they do not convert production equipment into realty or
integrate machines into the building structure, for they are not nec-
essary for the building to function as a building.80
Similarly, in Sevilla v. Stearns-Roger, Inc. ," the plaintiff was injured while
repairing a large "pan" that his employer used to refine sugar. The defend-
ants, who designed and manufactured the pan allegedly causing plaintiff's
injury, argued that California's statute of repose barred plaintiff's claim.
The court concluded that the defendants were not within the class of benefi-
ciaries protected by the California statute. Like the Washington court in
Condit, the court was troubled by the implications of allowing manufactur-
ers to invoke this statute of repose:
Defendants assert this limitation should be invoked to cut off
[plaintiff's] action because their 'pan' was ultimately installed in a
sugar refinery. By this simple fact, defendants claim, a 'product'
was transformed to an 'improvement of real property.' The effect
of such a transformation would severely limit the development of
products liability law and bestow this statutory protection on man-
ufacturers of allegedly defective products.8 2
80. Id. at 468-69.
81. 101 Cal. App. 3d 608, 161 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1980).
82. Id. at 611, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 702. Other courts also have refused to extend protection
under their respective state statutes to manufacturers and suppliers. See Northbrook Excess &
Surplus Ins. Co. v. J.G. Wilson Corp., 250 Ga. 691, 300 S.E.2d 507 (1983) (though Georgia
statute did not apply to "mere" manufacturer, manufacturer who participated in the design of
doors installed in building was within statute); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551
P.2d 647 (1976) (manufacturer of whirlpool machine installed in university field house not
within statute of repose); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, 223, cert. denied, 91
N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977) (to the extent defendant was sued as manufacturer of glass incor-
porated in building, statute of repose inapplicable; to the extent same defendant was sued as
designer or installer of glass, defendant was within the statute of repose); Swanson Furniture
Co. v. Advance Transformer Co., 105 Wis. 2d 321, 313 N.W.2d 840, 844 (1982) (Washington
statute "clearly does not apply to every manufacturer of any product which ultimately may be
used as an improvement to some real property"). See also Cornoyer v. Mass. Bay Transp.
Auth., 744 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1984) (defendant who supplied and designed a prefabricated
building could assert the statute because plaintiff sued on a theory of defective design);
Montaup Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Corp., 561 F. Supp. 740 (D.R.I. 1983) (interpreting Massa-
chusetts law) (same); Baker v. Walker & Walker, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 3d 746, 184 Cal. Rptr.
245 (1982) (manufacturer of goods installed in building cannot raise time bar); King's Dep't
Stores v. Poley-Abrams Corp., 386 Mass. 1008, 437 N.E.2d 237 (1982) (materialmen not
within statute);. Cf Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d 353 (Del. 1982) (supplier not within
language of Delaware statute). In construing the constitutionality of architects' and builders'
statutes of repose, other courts have assumed manufacturers and suppliers are not among the
beneficiaries of these statutes. See, e.g., President & Directors of Georgetown v. Madden, 505
F. Supp. 557 (D. Md. 1980), affid in part and appeal dismissed in part, 660 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.
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Although allowing manufacturers to raise the defense provided by archi-
tects' and builders' statutes of repose indeed may limit their exposure under
products liability concepts, the reasoning adopted by courts in denying pro-
tection to manufacturers and in narrowly interpreting the protected class is
questionable. If the electrical transfer switch assembly and other similar ob-
jects before the courts legitimately are characterized as improvements to real
property, the conclusion that the manufacturer is the "designer" of these
improvements seems inescapable. Indeed, in Condit, the court itself ac-
knowledged that the defendant "designed" the freezer system,83 thus further
eroding the persuasiveness of the court's reasoning. If the freezer is an im-
provement to real property, and the defendant designed the freezer, the in-
quiry concerning the statute's applicability should be concluded.
The analysis adopted by these courts is unsatisfactory for other reasons as
well. Under the two-tier approach suggested by some courts, a distinction is
drawn between those who design fungible or stock items, which incidentally
are incorporated into the realty, and those systems that are required for the
structure to function as intended.84 In addition, even if the product is a
stock item, these courts imply that a manufacturer nonetheless may avoid
liability if it played a role in the actual installation of the product.8 5
From a products liability standpoint, differentiating items that perform an
integral function, such as the electrical transfer switch assembly in Brown,
from fungible products, such as the acoustical plaster in Cinnaminson Town-
ship, is of questionable value. Integral components, as the plaintiff in Brown
unfortunately learned, are no less likely to have dangerous propensities than
ceiling tile that subsequently is determined to contain a potentially carcino-
genic substance.86 In each such case, moreover, the manufacturer is best
1981) (interpreting District of Columbia law); Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455
S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971); Skinner v. Anderson, 38 111. 2d 455,
231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); Freezer
Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978); Broome v. Truluck,
270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
83. 101 Wash. 2d at 107, 676 P.2d at 467.
84. See, e.g., Wayne Township Bd. of Educ. v. Strand Century, Inc., 172 N.J. Super. 296,
411 A.2d 1161 (1980); Brown v. Jersey Central Power Co., 163 N.J. Super. 179, 394 A.2d 397
(1978), cert. denied, 79 N.J. 489, 401 A.2d 244 (1979).
85. See, e.g., Cinnaminson Township Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 552 F. Supp. 855,
863 (D.N.J. 1982).
86. To determine the issue of whether the product serves an integral function, the proper
test to be applied is whether the product is an "improvement" to realty. The determination
does not turn on whether a certain class is protected under the applicable statute. See In re
Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 225 n.39 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929
(1983). One court has defined an "improvement" to be "a permanent and necesary part of the
building." Merne v. American Radiator Co., 150 Ky. 151, 150 S.W. 24, 25 (1912).
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able to distribute the risk of a defective product to the populace as a whole.8 7
The principal problem preventing clear analysis in this area is the failure
of various legislatures to anticipate application of statutes of repose such as
section 12-310 to situations not involving architects and other persons di-
rectly involved in constructing structural improvements to realty. The legis-
lative history accompanying section 12-310, for example, demonstrates an
intention to protect architects, engineers, and certain other construction pro-
fessionals. Nowhere in the legislative history, however, is there an explicit
recognition that the statute may be invoked by parties such as manufacturers
and suppliers of equipment incorporated into the realty.
88
Nevertheless, the legislature's failure to anticipate a particular application
of a statute provides no basis to deviate from the plain meaning of the statu-
tory language. Courts that create an exception where none exists in the stat-
utory language usurp a legislative function and, in effect, impose their own
view of legislative intent even though the statute as enacted fails to reflect
this supposed intent.8 9 For example, drawing a distinction among various
product manufacturers on the basis of whether their product is a stock item
or serves an integral purpose, or whether the manufacturer assisted in the
installation of the product, represents a wholly artificial solution to a prob-
lem whose cause is much more fundamental. If the statute is to be limited to
certain classes of defendants, the proper course is to amend the statute to
specifically identify the persons within the statute's ambit.
Although several courts have narrowly limited the class of persons pro-
tected by statutes of rqpose similar to section 12-310, other courts have not
been so constrained. In Wiggins v. Proctor & Schwartz,9° the plaintiff
brought an action against the manufacturer of a machine used in producing
87. Indeed, the dominant theme of tort law for the last several decades has been to place
liability on those best able to insure against loss and distribute this loss efficiently to the con-
suming public. But where a statute such as § 12-310 is at issue, and the provisions of the
statute are unambigious, then the court cannot properly abrogate its judicial function and
interpret the statute to further some unexpressed intention of the legislature, even though such
an interpretation may be consistent with some broader social goals.
88. But see S. REP. No. 1274, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972), where Congress stated that
"[e]ngineers who design and install equipment" were among the beneficiaries of § 12-310. A
manufacturer whose engineers designed equipment that qualified as an improvement to real
property arguably would be included in this category of beneficiaries.
89. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. See also Frankfurter, Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1947):
A Judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever
temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction
must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in by way of creation.
He must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense or internal contradiction.
90. 330 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1971), affidper curiam, Civil No. 71-1952 (4th Cir. Mar.
8, 1972) (unpublished).
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a jute. Plaintiff alleged that his personal injury was attributable to the "neg-
ligent and unsafe manufacture and unsafe and negligent design9 of the
machine. The defendant asserted as a defense the Virginia statute of repose,
which precluded personal injury actions filed more than five years after the
completion of improvements to real property.
9 2
The court agreed with defendant's contention that plaintiff's claims were
untimely. First, the court concluded that the machine was an "improve-
ment to real property" within the parameters of the Virginia statute. The
machine weighed approximately 4,500 pounds, and was affixed to a concrete
foundation by means of heavy hold-down bolts.93 The court held that the
machine constituted a common law fixture and, consequently, qualified as an
improvement to real property.
94
Second, the court considered whether the Virginia statute should extend
to manufacturers. The court observed it was "[p]robably true that architects
and engineers prompted the passage"9 5 of the Virginia statute, but saw no
reason why the statute should not also extend to manufacturers:
The statute should be given a reasonably liberal interpretation. If
it is to operate for the benefit of the contractor who erected the
building, it should also operate in like manner for the benefit of any
manufacturer who constructs an integral part of said building.
Persons who construct a factory may be called upon, as a part of
the contract, to provide many items which are included as perma-
nent fixtures in the original building. The same logic exists when a
permanent fixture is added as an improvement. While there may
be a material distinction between a manufacturer and a contractor
for tax purposes, a manufacturer of a given product is assuredly
one who designs, plans, supervises and constructs the improvement
91. Id. at 351.
92. The Virginia statute in effect at the time Wiggins was decided provided in pertinent
part:
No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for
bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of
an improvement to real property. . . shall be brought against any person performing
or furnishing the design, planning, surveying, supervision of construction or con-
struction of such improvement to real property more than five years after the per-
formance of furnishing of such services and construction. This limitation shall not
apply to actions against any person in actual possession and control as owner, tenant,
or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of
such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or damage for which
the action is brought.
VA. CODE § 8-24.2 (1964 ed.).
93. 330 F. Supp. at 351.
94. Id. at 352-53.
95. Id. at 353.
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which is considered as such the moment it is affixed to the realty.96
The court's decision in Wiggins prompted an immediate legislative re-
sponse amending the Virginia statute to specifically exclude actions against
manufacturers and suppliers.97 In view of the statutory language in effect at
the time, however, the Wiggins decision not only is defensible, but is also the
only result that could be reached consistent with the statute.
98
96. Id. In Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, the majority, like the Wiggins
court, observed the class of protected persons under the Oklahoma statute extended beyond
architects and engineers: "The statute probably was intended to limit the liability of the nar-
row class consisting of architects and engineers, etc. In its enacted form, it must be read to be
much broader and include materialmen, manufacturers or anyone involved in providing mate-
rial or service in the construction." 593 P.2d 143, 147 (Okla. 1977). See also Pacific Indem-
nity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977). In Pacific Indemnity, the
majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the Minnesota statute prohibiting actions
against "[a]ny person performing or furthering the design, planning, or supervision" of im-
provements to real property denied equal protection and was hence unconstitutional. Id. at
555. The dissent argued that the majority's assumption that certain classes of persons, such as
material suppliers, were not within the statute was unsupported:
But whether or not he takes part in the 'design' of the improvement, when the issue is
before us a persuasive argument can be made that a materialman does come within
the definition of 'any person performing . . . construction,' and consequently he is
not excluded from the favored class in a manner which renders that classification
impermissible. Certainly one who furnishes structural supplies, plumbing, or heating
or electrical equipment, fashioned for specific use in erecting a building, is a person
'performing' an integral part of the construction process. It would be difficult for us
to hold otherwise.
Id. at 559-60 (Otis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted, emphasis in original). Cf Adair v. Kop-
pers Co., 741 F.2d 111, 116 (6th Cir. 1984) (product liability action not excluded from opera-
tion of the statute; defendant who "designed, manufactured, installed, and sold" a coal
handling system is within statute of repose); KSLA-TV Inc. v. Radio Corp. of America, 501 F.
Supp. 891, 898 (W.D. La. 1980), affid in pertinent part, 693 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1982) (contrac-
tor who was materialman and manufacturer of television transmission tower is within ambit of
statute).
97. The General Assembly of Virginia viewed Wiggins as an erroneous interpretation of
§ 8-24.2 and adopted an emergency measure effective March 13, 1973, excluding manufactur-
ers and suppliers from the Virginia statute of repose. See Hupman v. Cook, 640 F.2d 497, 498
(4th Cir. 1981). According to certain members of the General Assembly, the Virginia statute
" 'was never intended to cover or apply to manufacturers of any equipment machinery or
articles whether or not they become an improvement to real property.'" Smith v. Allen-Brad-
ley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698, 701 n.4 (W.D. Va. 1974) (citing Report of the House Delegates
Committee for Court of Justice, Feb. 5, 1973). The Virginia statute currently in effect specifi-
cally excludes manufacturers and suppliers: "This limitation shall not apply to the manufac-
turer or supplier of any equipment or machinery or any other articles which are installed in or
become a part of any real property either as an improvement or otherwise." VA. CODE § 8.01-
250 (1984).
98. As the Fourth Circuit in Hupman v. Cook, 640 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1981) observed in
connection with Wiggins: "The General Assembly used language plainly compelling the result
in Wiggins, despite any unexpressed intention to the contrary. 'If Parliament does not mean
what it says it must say so.'" Id. at 504 (citing A. HERBERT, THE UNCOMMON LAW 313 (7th
ed. 1950)).
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Both the Virginia statute under consideration in Wiggins and section 12-
310 fail to specifically delineate the class of persons who may assert the time
bar specified by the statute. Indeed, the language of section 12-310 is even
broader than the former Virginia statute.9 9 If the legislative intent were to
limit the applicability of the statute to certain persons, this intent was not
manifested in the Virginia statute of repose. Nor is such an intent apparent
in the current statutory language of section 12-310.
Besides Wiggins, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also ap-
proved an expansive reading of an architects' and builders' statute of repose
in In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation. " There, plaintiffs brought suit against
a manufacturer of aluminum electrical wire, claiming the wire had caused a
fire in a restaurant. Defendants argued that plaintiffs' cause of action was
precluded by operation of the Kentucky statute of repose, which barred ac-
tions after the expiration of five years following substantial completion of an
improvement to real property. The district court concluded the defendants
were not within the class of beneficiaries protected by the statute. The Sixth
Circuit disagreed, noting that in view of its unambiguous language, the stat-
ute should be interpreted to include materialmen such as the defendant:
We are not nearly so confident as the trial court that the statute
ought to be narrowly construed. The statute requires that '[n]o
action to recover damages. . . arising out of any deficiency in the
design . . . of any improvement to real property . . . shall be
brought against any person performing or furnishing the design
. ' Whether or not we may agree with the results, we cannot
alter the language of the statute, which by its terms covers all per-
sons furnishing such designs. 'If that language is plain and unam-
biguous its meaning should be upheld as so expressed,
uninfluenced by any unwise or unusual result that might follow the
upholding of the plainly expressed writing or statutes . . .
The court also observed that passage of legislation such as the Kentucky
statute of repose was premised upon the peculiar position of architects and
other persons involved in the construction process. With the abolishment of
privity of contract as a defense, these persons confronted potential liability
99. The Virginia statute provided that no action "[s]hall be brought against any person
performing or furnishing the design, planning, surveying, supervision of construction or con-
struction." VA. CODE § 8-24.2 (1964 ed.). Most other states similarly limit the applicability of
their architects' and builders' statutes of repose. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Section 12-310, however, fails to designate in any manner the persons who may assert the
defense provided by the statute.
100. 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983).
101. Id. at 224 (citing Reynolds Metal Co. v. Glass, 302 Ky. 622, 195 S.W.2d 280, 283
(1946) (footnote and citation omitted; emphasis in original).
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for actions which may have occurred many years earlier. However, those
designing parts that were intended to become part of the realty faced a simi-
lar threat of indefinite liability. Absent exclusionary language pertaining to
materialmen, it could "safely be assumed"1 °2 that these persons were pro-
tected by the Kentucky statute. 103
Elevator manufacturers also have successfully raised statutes of repose as
a defense to product-related injuries. In Mitchell v. United Elevator Co., °
plaintiff fell while entering an elevator and brought suit against various de-
fendants, including Westinghouse who "built and installed"10 5 the elevator.
The court, citing a legal dictionary's definition of the term "improve-
ment," 10 6 concluded that the elevator system qualified as such. Thus, West-
inghouse properly could raise the Pennsylvania statute of repose pertaining
to improvements to real property to avoid liability.
Similarly, in Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co. ,107 a wrongful death and survival
action was brought based upon an allegedly defective design of an elevator
that had been designed, manufactured, and sold by the defendant. The court
observed that "[a]n elevator in a multi-story building obviously constitutes
an improvement on real property,"' ' and that the manufacturer was "[a]
person performing or furnishing construction of the elevator even though it
did not install it in the building."' 9
102. Id. at 225.
103. In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation provides a poignant example of the judicary's strug-
gle to interpret the parameters of architects' and builders' statutes of repose. After the Sixth
Circuit remanded the case because of juror misconduct, the district court certified to the
Supreme Court of Kentucky the question of whether the Kentucky statue was constitutional as
applied to the facts of the case. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, over the dissent of two
justices, held that product manufacturers were not within the class of beneficiaries of the stat-
ute. In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 676 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1984).
104. 290 Pa. Super 476, 434 A.2d 1243 (1981).
105. Id. at 485, 434 A.2d at 1248.
106. Id. at 488, 434 A.2d at 1249.
107. 618 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S.
802 (1982).
108. Id. at 872.
109. Id. The court's decision in Ellerbe is somewhat confusing. On the one hand, the
court concludes that the manufacturer of the elevator may assert the Texas statute of repose.
At the same time, however, the court states that materialmen "[m]ay be excluded" from the
statute. 618 S.W.2d at 873. "Materialman" under Texas law has been defined "[a]s a person
who does not engage in the business of building or contracting to build homes for others, but
who manufactures . . . materials which enter into buildings .... " Reddix v. Eaton Corp.,
662 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (emphasis in original). In Reddix,
the court held that manufacturers of component parts of an elevator are not within the Texas
statute. Ellerbe can be construed as consistent with decisions denying relief to "mere" manu-
facturers, but allowing the manufacturer to raise the statute of repose if it participated in the
"design" of the product. See, e.g., Northbrook Excess & Ins. Co. v. J.G. Wilson Co., 250 Ga.
691, 300 S.E.2d 507 (1983) (manufacturer who participated in design of doors installed in a
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Section 12-310 as currently drafted contains no limitation on the class of
persons who may properly invoke the ten-year limitations period. By its
terms, section 12-310 bars "any action" if the other requirements of the stat-
ute are satisfied. The legislative history, although identifying certain benefi-
ciaries of the statute, does not undertake to provide an exclusive list of
protected classes. The only class of potential defendants that is expressly
excluded from the statute is the owners of the realty. 1 o Without legislative
guidance in the form of explicit statutory language, a plain reading of section
12-310 allows persons other than those mentioned in the legislative history
to raise the umbrella of protection afforded by the statute. This interpreta-
tion is not necessarily desirable. Indeed, as discussed below, several reasons
suggest that the legislature should amend section 12-310 to narrow its appli-
cability. This task, however, is a decidedly legislative function, not a judicial
one.
IV. THE EFFECT OF SECTION 12-310 ON A PLAINTIFF'S
CAUSE OF ACTION
Although section 12-310 in its present form may be interpreted to allow
manufacturers and other persons not directly involved in the construction
process to assert the limitations period set forth in the statute, such an inter-
pretation may deprive litigants of an effective remedy for injury or death
caused by defective or unsafe products located on the realty. This result,
although not expressly contemplated by Congress,"'1 proceeds from the fail-
ure of the statute's drafters to specifically delineate the scope of the statute's
application.
To envision the potential effect of section 12-310, consider a situation in
building within the statute); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 cert. denied, 91 N.M.
3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977) (to the extent glass manufacturer sued as designer or installer of glass,
manufacturer may raise statute of repose).
In Jones v. Ohio Bldg. Co., 4 Ohio Misc. 2d 10, 447 N.E.2d 776 (1982), the court, relying on
Mitchell and Ellerbe, held that an elevator company that "designed, constructed, installed, and
serviced" an elevator fell within the class of beneficiaries of the Ohio architects' and builders'
statute of repose. Id. at 778. See also Cournoyer v. Mass. Transp. Auth., 744 F.2d 208 (1st
Cir. 1984) (supplier of prefabricated building that was sued in its capacity as a designer could
assert the statute of repose); Jasinski v. Showboat Operating Co., 459 F. Supp. 309 (D.C. Nev.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 644 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1981) (Nevada statute applied to sup-
plier and seller of shower doors installed in hotel). Cf Mullis v. Southern Co. Servs., 250 Ga.
90, 92 n.2, 296 S.E.2d 579, 582 n.2 (1982) (favored class under Georgia statute may be larger
than architects, engineers, and contractors).
110. That Congress specifically excepted claims against one class of defendants and not
other classes provides additional support for the argument that all classes of potential defend-
ants not excepted from the statute may assert the statute's protection. See supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
111. But see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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which a tenant in an apartment building is injured by a defective product
serving the building.' 12 Typically, the tenant in this example sues the apart-
ment building owner, who specifically is exempted from the operation of
section 12-310, as well as the product manufacturer on the theories of negli-
gence, strict liability in tort, 1' 3 and breach of warranty. Similarly, the owner
and manufacturer may file cross-claims against the other seeking contribu-
tion or indemnity. Because of section 12-310, however, the injured tenant's
claims against the manufacturer, as well as the owner's cross-claim, may be
precluded.
Equipment incorporated in the realty, by virtue of its physical size, degree
of annexation to the realty, and essential purpose that it may serve in render-
ing the premises habitable, may qualify as an improvement to real property
pursuant to the common sense test employed by many courts 114 or tradi-
tional common law fixture analysis.' 5 Accordingly, if the defective product
causing the tenant's injury is characterized as an improvement and the ten-
ant fails to file suit within ten years after the product was first available for
use, the manufacturer may assert the bar raised by the statute to relieve itself
112. This is not an entirely hypothetical situation. In Oates v. H.G. Smithy Co., Civil
Action No. 6999-79 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1979), a tenant burned by water heated by an allegedly
defective water heater installed more than 10 years before the injury occurred brought suit
against the owners and managing agent of the realty, the plumbing company that installed the
water heater, and the manufacturer of the water heater. This author's firm represented the
manufacturer. The manufacturer and plumbing company argued, inter alia, that § 12-310 pre-
cluded suit against them on the basis of an allegedly unsafe and defective improvement to real
property. The trial court granted both the manufacturer's and plumbing company's motions
for summary judgment.
Of course, § 12-3 10 is applicable to situations other than personal injury or wrongful death
actions. The statute also applies to actions to recover damages for injury to real or personal
property. Nevertheless, the personal injury example is a relatively common situation and viv-
idly portrays the potential wide-ranging ramifications of the statute.
113. The District of Columbia has not expressly adopted strict liability in tort; however,
several decisions suggest that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would follow the
majority of other jurisdictions and allow such a claim. See, e.g., Russell v. G.A.F. Corp., 422
A.2d 989 (D.C. 1980); Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. 1979); Berman
v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978); Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., 262
A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970); Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds, Inc., 637 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983).
114. See, e.g., Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.
1977) (furnace an improvement).
115. See, e.g., Knell v. Morris, 39 Cal. 2d 450, 247 P.2d 352 (1952) (water heater attached
to building by gas and water pipes may constitute fixture); Schofer v. Hoffman, 182 Md. 270,
34 A.2d 350 (1943) (oil heater and water tank fixtures); Wood Hydraulic Hoist & Body Co. v.
Norton, 269 Mich. 341, 257 N.W. 836 (1934) (residential heating system a fixture even though
system could easily be removed by means of wrench without damaging realty). Moreover, the
legislative history of section 12-310 also contemplates that "equipment" located on the realty
may constitute an improvement to real property subject to the statute. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
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of any liability to the tenant as well as to the owner on any cross-claim.116
The ten-year limitations period set forth in section 12-310 does not apply
to "any action based on a contract, express or implied." '117 The tenant's
claims against the manufacturer premised upon negligence and strict liability
are based in tort, not in contract.' 18 Hence, the tenant is precluded from
obtaining recovery on these theories of liability if the other prerequisites of
section 12-310 are satisfied.
Characterizing the tenant's breach of warranty claim is more problematic,
and involves consideration of the esoteric and somewhat mysterious evolu-
tion of the law of warranty. Furthermore, regardless of whether this war-
ranty claim is based on contract-and thus excepted from the application of
section 12-310-the tenant must nonetheless satisfy the requirements of the
District of Columbia's version of the Uniform Commercial Code. The re-
quirements of the Uniform Commercial Code, independent of the operation
of section 12-310, may preclude a tenant's breach of warranty action.
Both the genesis of warranty law and the question whether a breach of
warranty is based in tort or contract principles have provided a fertile
ground for exploration by legal scholars.119 There is general agreement that
originally a breach of warranty action was grounded in tort, closely resem-
bling the tort of deceit.120 Gradually, grievants seeking relief for a breach of
warranty brought suit under indebitatus assumpsit, an action based on a con-
tractual relationship between the buyer and seller. Under this theory, the
seller expressly or impliedly promised the quality or safety of goods and was
116. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310(b)(1) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
117. An "express contract" is one in which the terms of the parties' agreement are declared
by the parties in writing or orally. Implied contracts consist of two generic types. Where the
parties' agreement is inferred from their conduct, without written or spoken words, the con-
tract is said to be "implied in fact." In contrast, "implied in law" contracts or "quasi con-
tracts" are obligations imposed by law to do justice between the parties, even though no
promise was made or intended. See generally 1 S. WILLISTON, A TRETISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS §§ 3, 3A (Jaeger ed. 1957); A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 18-19 (1963);
L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1965); J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1-12 (2d ed. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981).
118. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment 1(1965) ("The liabil-
ity stated [i.e., in strict liability] is one in tort, and does not require any contractual relation, or
privity of contract, between the plaintiff and the defendant.").
119. See, e.g., Ames, History ofAssumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1888); Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124-34 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 800-05 (1966). See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 95, at
634-39 (4th ed. 1971).
120. See Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d at 1355; Picker X-Ray Corp. v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919, 920 (D.C. 1962). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 119,
at § 95.
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held liable for breaching this promise. Persons other than the buyer, how-
ever, were considered "strangers to the contract," and without privity. Ab-
sent privity of contract, these more remote persons originally were deemed
unable to maintain a warranty action. 12'
The hybrid nature of warranty claims is complicated further by the impre-
cise terminology sometimes used by courts in describing strict liability and
warranty actions. Courts may characterize strict liability actions as concep-
tually identical to those of implied warranty.122 The implied warranty re-
121. See supra note 120. Privity of contract consists of two distinct types. Vertical privity
of contract exists where there is a direct buyer-seller relationship. Conversely, there is lack of
vertical privity where a person is only a subpurchaser in the chain of distribution. Thus, there
is no vertical privity of contract between a manufacturer of a product and a person who
purchases the product from a person or entity other than the manufacturer, such as a local
retailer.
The second type of privity, known as horizontal privity, encompasses the rights of those
persons who are neither purchasers nor subpurchasers, but who consume, use, or are otherwise
affected by the goods. Whether these persons may enforce a particular warranty depends upon
an interpretation of the particular jurisdiction's version of § 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The District of Columbia's version, entitled "Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties
Express or Implied," defines the class of persons who are deemed to be in horizontal privity
with the buyer and capable of enforcing the seller's warranties. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-318
(1981 & Supp. 1985). See generally Freeman & Dressel, Warranty Law in Maryland Product
Liability Cases: Strict Liability Incognito?, 5 U, BALT. L. REv. 47, 52 (1975). Section 2-318
does not concern the issue of vertical privity and the ability of persons in the product's distri-
bution chain to maintain an action. See U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 3 (1972). See also Cottom v.
McGuire Funeral Serv., 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970). See generally Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 743
(1980).
122. Two commentators describe the overlapping terminology used by courts in describing
strict liability and implied warranty actions as follows:
The principal effort expended in the warranty area has been in the obliteration of
the defense of privity. For this reason, and because of the historical affinity to war-
ranty law which product liability cases have had, courts often talk of strict liability
cases being one of a "warranty" to all users or consumers, in the same sense as results
under the concept of strict liability in tort. There certainly is no magic in the name
given to the cause of action, and strict liability in warranty is as useful a term as strict
liability in tort, so long as the use of it is not confused with the contract trappings
which have traditionally accompanied warranty law. The drafters of the Restate-
ment, Second, of Torts Section acknowledged this when, in Comment m to Section
402A, it was written:
"There is nothing in this section which would prevent any court from treating the
rule stated as a matter of 'warranty' to the user or consumer."
But in the next sentence it is pointed out that,
"if this is done, it should be recognized and understood that the 'warranty' is a very
different kind of warranty from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is
not subject to the various contract rules which have grown up to surround such
sales."
If a court does not require, inter alia, privity of contract, a sale, or notice of a
breach of warranty, and does not give effect to a disclaimer, does it matter that the
defendant is being held strictly liable in warranty rather than in tort? The answer
[Vol. 34:919
Architects' and Builders' Statute of Repose
ferred to by these courts, however, is different from the kind of warranty
usually found in the sale of goods. This latter kind of warranty is governed
by the particular jurisdiction's version of the Uniform Commercial Code.
In the example of the injured tenant, the tenant may assert both broad
types of warranty claims. The first, synonymous with a strict liability cause
of action, is not based on an express or implied contract exempt from section
12-310, but it is imposed in tort as a matter of social policy. The second,
warranties provided by the Uniform Commercial Code, are also arguably
based in tort if there exists no vertical privity of contract between the tenant
and manufacturer.
123
seems obvious. If a court imposes strict warranty liability irrespective of contract
and sales rules, then strict liability in warranty and tort are synonymous.
2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 16A[4][a], at 3B-33 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
The confusion prevalent in this area is demonstrated in Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv.,
262 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970). There, a pallbearer filed suit against the sellers of a funeral casket
for injuries received when the casket fell and struck him. Although the plaintiff was not the
purchaser, the court nonetheless allowed the plaintiff to proceed on an implied warranty the-
ory of recovery. In doing so, the court spoke in terms strongly reminiscent of strict liability in
tort, even though it expressly disavowed adoption of this theory of liability:
Whether contract or tort, there is a liability imposed for injury caused by placing a
defective product into the stream of commerce in the District of Columbia. For
present purposes we are not required to adopt the theory of strict liability in tort with
all its implications.
There is no logical or legal reason why only a purchaser may recover for injuries
sustained due to a defective product. The cases are too numerous to mention where
nonpurchasers have been allowed to recover. Certainly, an intended user or con-
sumer is entitled to as much protection as a purchaser.
Appellant was an intended user of the handles on this casket. He can recover if he
can prove that the product entered the stream of commerce in a defective state, that
the defect existed at the time of the injury, and that the defect caused the injury.
262 A.2d at 809-10. See also Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301, 1305 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); Towers Tenant Ass'n v. Towers Ltd. Partnership, 563 F. Supp. 566, 574 n.5
(D.D.C. 1983) ("In the District of Columbia, these theories [implied warranty/strict liability]
are conceptually identical."); Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130, 1133 (D.D.C.
1979). Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not expressly adopted strict
liability in tort, Cottom and subsequent decisions have been cited as precedent indicating the
District of Columbia's endorsement of this doctrine. See Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds, Inc.,
637 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., 559 F.
Supp. 333, 345 (D.D.C. 1983); Towers Tenant Ass'n v. Towers Ltd. Partnership, 563 F. Supp.
566, 574 (D.D.C. 1983); Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130, 1134 (D.C. 1979)
(Kelly, Jr., concurring).
123. Lack of vertical privity of contract in itself does not preclude a warranty cause of
action in the District of Columbia. In Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d
919 (D.C. 1962), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals expressly abandoned the require-
ment of vertical privity of contract allowing an indirect purchaser of an automobile to sue the
manufacturer on the basis of a breach of an implied warranty. Yet, while the District of
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Nevertheless, even if this second type of warranty action is premised on
contract and not subject to the preclusive effect of section 12-310, require-
ments of the Uniform Commercial Code may bar the tenant's warranty
claim. The tenant is not likely to have purchased the product but rather is
more likely to have used a product purchased by another. As such, the ten-
ant must fall within the class of beneficiaries of the manufacturer's warran-
ties as defined in section 28:2-318 of the District of Columbia Code, the most
restrictive of the three section 2-318 alternatives proposed by the drafters of
the Uniform Commercial Code. 124 Further, section 28:2-725 of the District
Columbia has vitiated the requirement of vertical privity, this is not to say an action brought
by a nonvertical privity plaintiff is premised upon contract and hence exempt from the opera-
tion of § 12-310. Without vertical privity, there is no contract between plaintiff and some
remote party. Cf Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960) ("No one
doubts that, unless there is privity, liability to the consumer must be in tort and not con-
tract."). See also Picker, 185 A.2d at 921 ("courts have begun to disassociate contract from
warranty and to recognize that a warranty is a duty imposed by law for protection of the
buying public, regardless of the consent of the parties."); Kinney v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 134 Vt. 571, 367 A.2d 677, 679 (1976) ("If the absence of any contractual relationship
between the parties does not bar liability, it is difficult indeed to perceive how the liability can
'sound' in contract."). But see § 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code which states that the
Code's warranty of merchantability is "[i]mplied in a contract" for the sale of goods. U.C.C.
§ 2-314 (1972).
An approach relying on the presence or lack of privity in characterizing the nature of a
party's warranty claim may be criticized as revitalizing archaic privity principles in an age
where the importance of privity has all but vanished. In fact, the legislative history accompa-
nying H.R. 6527, an earlier version of § 12-310 that did not pass Congress, faintly suggests
that Congress may have intended the exception pertaining to actions based on an express or
implied contract to include breach of warranty claims. See Hearing Before Subcommittee No.
1 of the Committee on the District of Columbia House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
11, 46 (1967). See also 113 CONG. REC. 28,158 (1967); President and Directors of Georgetown
College v. Madden, 505 F. Supp. 557, 577 (D. Md.), affd in part and appeal dismissed in part,
660 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1981). However, the more analytically sound view is that a breach of
warranty claim where there exists no direct buyer-seller relationship rests on tort principles,
and not on an express or implied contract. This view also is more consistent with the evolution
of the law of warranty, which has its origin in tort, not contract. If Congress' intent were to
exclude warranty actions from the statute, the best means to achieve that result is to amend the
statute and specify the actions not subject to the 10-year limitations period.
124. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-318 (1981 & Supp. 1985) provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is
in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reason-
able to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit
the operation of this section.
Jurisdictions that have adopted the same or similar versions of § 2-318 have concluded that
tenants are not within the class of persons who may assert a manufacturer's breach of war-
ranty. See Neofes v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 409 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D. Ind. 1976); Home v.
Armstrong Prods. Corp., 416 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1969). Before the revision of Maryland's
version of § 2-318 extending a seller's warranties to the "ultimate consumer," the Maryland
Court of Appeals also restrictively interpreted the parameters of § 2-318. See, e.g., Blanken-
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of Columbia Code provides that a breach of warranty claim must be brought
within four years after the cause of action accrues. 125 A cause of action for
breach of warranty normally accrues when "tender of delivery is made."
' 126
To the extent that this four-year statute of limitations governs personal in-
jury actions, 12 section 28:2-725, like section 12-310, may foreclose an in-
ship v. Morrison Mach. Co., 255 Md. 241, 257 A.2d 430 (1969) (employee of purchaser not
within § 2-318). See also Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co., 385 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1974)
(member of armed forces injured by product purchased by federal government not within class
of persons specified by § 2-318. See generally Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 743 (1980).
125. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-725 (1981 & Supp. 1985) provides in pertinent part:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four
years after cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may
reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of
delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future perform-
ance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such perform-
ance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
Id.
126. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-725(2) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
127. Compare Garvie v. Duo-Fast Corp., 711 F.2d 47, (5th Cir. 1983) (personal injury
action must be brought within four-year limitations period of § 2-725); Johnson v. Hockessin
Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154 (Del. 1980) (same); Commercial Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. v.
McCampbell, 580 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn. 1979) (same); General Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark.
347, 516 S.W.2d 602 (1974) (same) with Becker v. Volkswagen of American, Inc., 52 Cal. App.
3d Supp. 794, 125 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1975) (personal injury action governed by California one-
year statute of limitation, not § 2-725); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 256 Pa. Super.
330, 389 A.2d 1148 (1978) (four-year limitation period of § 2-725 does not apply to third-party
personal injury actions arising from defective products). See also Stanford v. Lesco, 10 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 812, 813-14 (D.D.C. 1972) (breach of warranty claim in District of
Columbia governed by D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-725 (1981 & Supp. 1985); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Goudie, 290 A.2d 826, 830 (D.C.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972) (implying that
§ 28:2-725 would apply to plaintiff's claim had it accrued after the effective date of the stat-
ute). See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 11-9 (2d ed. 1980); Annot., 20 A.L.R.4th 915 (1983); Burch, A
Practitioner's Guide to the Statutes of Limitations in Product Liability Suits, 5 U. BALT. L.
REV. 23, 28-29 (1975), where the author argues that the limitations period set forth in § 2-725
of the Uniform Commercial Code is not as unfair as it might appear because the remedies
contained in the Code are in addition to other common law or statutory remedies available to
an injured person.
Excepted from this normal accrual date is any warranty that "[e]xplicitly extends to future
performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance
... " In such a case, the cause of action "[a]ccrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered." Some courts have concluded that the Code's implied warranties do not explicitly
extend to the future performance of goods. "It does not seem logical that the Code intended
that an implied warranty be explicitly extended to future performance. The words 'explicit'
and 'implied' are contradictory." General Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 516 S.W.2d
602, 605-06 (1974). See also Stumler v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 644 F.2d 667, 669 (7th Cir.
1981) (implied warranties by definition do not explicitly extend to future performance); Stan-
dard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 820 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
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jured person's cause of action before the occurrence of an injury that
otherwise might be compensable. 
128
Yet other traps lurk to ensnare the unwary litigant proceeding on a war-
ranty-based theory of recovery under the Uniform Commercial Code. Lack
of requisite notice, 121 contributory negligence, 13' assumption of risk,"' and
disclaimers' 32 all may thwart a warranty action.
The restrictions imposed by the Uniform Commercial Code are of little
practical significance when the breach of warranty action is brought in con-
junction with claims of negligence and strict liability in tort. If the warranty
claim is dismissed, the litigant still may proceed on the negligence and strict
liability claims. When viewed in connection with section 12-310, however,
the requirements of the Code take on much greater significance. Unless an
action is brought within the ten-year period specified in the statute, section
12-310 precludes tort-based negligence and strict liability causes of action.
Of course, this is not to say that the requirements of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code serve no useful function. Rather, the salient point is the draft-
ers of section 12-310 did not foresee the statute's potentially far-reaching
consequences. Although drafted with the intent to protect design and con-
struction professionals from indefinite liability, the statute also invites appli-
cation to situations not expressly contemplated by Congress. Persons
U.S. 923 (1979) (same); Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1103 (N.D.N.Y.
1977). See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra at § 11-10; Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 690
(1979).
128. Pursuant to § 28:2-725, a cause of action for breach of warranty normally expires four
years after tender of delivery is made. Thus, a person injured more than four years after tender
of delivery possesses no warranty cause of action unless the warranty in issue "explicitly ex-
tends to future performance of the goods." See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-725(2) (1981 & Supp.
1985). See also supra note 127.
129. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-607(3) (1981 & Supp. 1985). See also Rock Creek Gin-
ger Ale Co. v. Thermice Corp., 352 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1971). See generally J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 127, at § 11-10; Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 363 (1979). See also W. PROSSER,
supra note 119, § 97, at 655 (§ 2-607(3) is a "booby-trap for the unwary").
130. Courts are divided concerning whether contributory negligence may preclude a war-
ranty action. Compare Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965) (con-
tributory negligence no defense) with Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861
(1955) (contributory negligence a defense); Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343
(10th Cir. 1962) (contributory negligence no defense but may demonstrate lack of proximate
causation). Two commentators advocate this last view, arguing that contributory negligence
may "[a]ttenuate the causal connection between defendant's act and plaintiff's injury to bar
recovery." See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 127, § 11-8, at 411. See generally Annot.
4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965).
131. Unlike contributory negligence, assumption of risk is generally recognized as a de-
fense in a warranty action. See, e.g., Bronson v. Club Comanche, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 21 (D.V.I.
1968); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965). See generally J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 127, § 11-8, at 412; Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965).
132. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
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injured by defective products incorporated into the realty may find that the
only cause of action they may pursue is a breach of warranty claim subject to
the various requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code. Ironically, their
potential claims are limited merely because they were injured by a product
that has gained stature as an improvement to real property. Other litigants
who have been injured similarly, perhaps by the identical product that did
not form part of the realty, may raise the full panoply of claims without
regard to the preclusive effect of section 12-310.
Section 12-310(b)(2) specifically excludes actions against the real property
owner. 133 Thus, a plaintiff theoretically may obtain relief against the owner
for injuries attributable to defective improvements to the realty. Actions
against the real property owner, however, may present several practical bar-
riers for effective relief. In the example of the tenant injured by a defective
product, the theory of strict liability may not be available in an action
against the owner of the realty. 134 Consequently, the plaintiff must proceed
upon an alternative theory such as negligence or breach of warranty. 135 An
action premised on these theories requires the plaintiff to present different
elements of proof, and is subject to different defenses, than an action
grounded in strict liability in tort.
In addition, plaintiff's injury may be attributable solely to the defective
product. The owner's actions may be entirely in accordance with those of
the hypothetical reasonable person. Plaintiff, unable to demonstrate negli-
133. Id. § 12-310(b)(2).
134. Courts are divided whether a tenant may proceed on a strict liability theory against
the lessor for a defective condition in the demised premises. Compare Becker v. IRM Corp.,
192 Cal. Rptr. 570, 144 Cal. App. 3d 321 (1983) (strict liability appropriate) with Dwyer v.
Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463, afl'd, 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1
(1973) (no strict liability cause of action). In Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals suggested that a strict liability action was available against land-
lords, but expressly reserved ruling on this issue. 391 A.2d 1351, 1359-60. See also George
Washington Univ. v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43, 49 n.9 (D.C. 1983). Cf Towers Tenant Ass'n v.
Towers Ltd. Partnership, 563 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1983) (strict liability action exists against
builder/vendor/developer of condominium units). See generally Browder, The Taming of a
Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV. 99 (1982).
135. It is unclear whether a breach of warranty action is available in the first instance in
this situation. The applicable "warranty" in the landlord-tenant context is the implied war-
ranty of habitability, which requires the landlord to keep the premises in a habitable condition.
See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.); cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970); George Washington Univ. v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43 (D.C. 1983). Several courts,
however, have held the implied warranty of habitability does not apply in a personal injury
action by the tenant against the landlord. See, e.g., Porter v. Lumbermen's Inv. Corp., 606
S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Morris v. Kaylor Eng'g Co., 565 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978) (writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301
A.2d 463, aft'd, 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
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gence or breach of warranty on the part of the owner, consequently may be
denied recovery.
Alternatively, if a jury renders a "sympathy" verdict in plaintiff's behalf,
the owner may be precluded from seeking contribution or indemnity by vir-
tue of section 12-3 10(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, the owner may shoulder a dis-
proportionate share of liability that properly should be borne by a third
party. 136
Finally, although a majority of owners presumably carry liability insur-
ance for injuries occurring on their premises, some owners either are unin-
sured or carry insufficient liability coverage. In situations where the owner
and a third party would be jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff but for
the protection afforded the third party under section 12-310, plaintiff may be
deprived of a "deep pocket" to satisfy a potential judgment.
V. THE EFFECT OF SECTION 12-310 ON THE RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION
OR INDEMNIFICATION
The foregoing discussion focused on the rights of an injured party vis-&-vis
the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product that qualifies as an im-
provement to real property within the ambit of section 12-310. Under cer-
tain circumstances, the statute may foreclose the party's claims based upon
strict liability, negligence-, and breach of warranty against the manufacturer.
Section 12-310 may bar other claims as well. Specifically, section 12-
310(a)(1)(B) prohibits a claim for "contribution or indemnity" brought as a
result of any injury or death subject to the statute.1
37
136. In Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967), the potential unfair-
ness of a statute similar to § 12-310 was cited in support of the court's conclusion that the
Illinois statute was unconstitutional:
It is not at all inconceivable that the owner or person in control of such an improve-
ment might be held liable for damage or injury that results from a defective condition
for which the architect or contractor is in fact responsible. Not only is the owner or
person in control given no immunity; the statute takes away his action for indemnity
against the architect or contractor.
38 Il1. 2d at 460, 231 N.E.2d at 591. See also Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568
(1974).
137. Although sometimes described synonomously, the doctrines of contribution and in-
demnity are conceptually distinct. Contribution involves the distribution among responsible
tortfeasors of loss caused to an injured party; indemnity involves the full shifting of liability to
another. See generally 3A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 44.02[2]
(1984); W. PROSSER, supra note 114, at § 51 (4th ed. 1971); Comment, Contribution and the
Distribution of Loss Among Tortfeasors, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 203 (1975); Phillips, Contribution
and Indemnity in Products Liability, 42 TENN. L. REV. 85 (1974); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943,
947-48 (1969). The state of confusion inherent to the law of contribution and indemnity has
proven disconcerting to commentators attempting to analyze these two doctrines:
The authors of the present text want to utter the caveat here, at the outset of this
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Although the bar relating to contribution and indemnity claims contained
in section 12-310(a)(1)(B) appears straightforward, section 12-310(b) in-
troduces confusion into this statutory scheme. This provision specifically
excludes the following from the statute's operation: (1) any action based on
an express or implied contract, and (2) actions against the person who, at the
time of the injury or death, either was the owner of or was in actual posses-
sion or control of the real property. The source of confusion is twofold.
First, an indemnification action may be premised on an express contract
between an indemnitor and indemnitee. If the action is based on an express
contract, clearly it is excluded from operation of the statute. Even absent an
express indemnification agreement, however, an indemnity action also is pre-
mised on contract. In this situation, indemnification is characterized as
based on a contractual obligation implied in law or quasicontract.1 38 Fur-
ther, although the right of contribution arises from equitable principles re-
quiring persons under a common burden to share that burden equitably, this
right also is quasicontractual in nature. 139 In the broadest sense then, every
indemnification and contribution action can be construed as based on either
an express or implied contract. Accordingly, even absent an express con-
tract, an owner could seek indemnification or contribution against the archi-
discussion of indemnity between or among tortfeasors, that any attempt to reconcile
the numerous decisions and particularly the sweeping pronouncements often found
in them, is an exercise frustrating utility. The law as to indemnity among tortfeasors,
like that of contribution among them, is in a state of development, flux, and evolu-
tion. In some aspects, the two appear to merge.
S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE, & A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS, § 3:26, at 479 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as S. SPEISER].
138. See, e.g., Nordstrom v. District of Columbia, 213 F. Supp. 315, 318 (D.D.C.), rev'd on
other grounds, 327 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1963). See also Larson Mach., Inc. v. Wallace, 268
Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980) where the court noted:
The basis for the right to indemnity in a case where there is no express contract,
therefore, is liability upon an implied contract or quasi-contract. . . . [t]he doctrine
of indemnity is based upon the equitable principles of restitution which permit one
who is compelled to pay money, which in justice ought to be paid by another, to
recover the sums so paid unless the payor is barred by the wrongful nature of his own
conduct.
Id. at 213-14, 600 S.W.2d at 12. See also 3A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 137, at
15-19 (1983) ("[i]ndemnity is premised on contract principles, either express or implied
139. Implied in law or quasi-contracts are obligations imposed by law to do justice between
the parties, regardless of the parties' consent. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Although courts have stressed the equitable nature of contribution, the principle of contribu-
tion coincides with the definition and purpose of implied in law contracts. See Builders Supply
Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 336, 77 A.2d 368, 375 (1951) ("[t]he right of contribution is a
quasi-contractual right arising by reason of an implied engagement of each to help bear the
common burden. ... ). Some courts have also applied the statute of limitations governing
contracts to claims for contribution. See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 927 (1974).
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tect, builder, or any other beneficiary of section 12-310 irrespective of the
time limitation set forth in the statute.
This result, of course, flies in the face of the legislature's intent to elimi-
nate the threat of continued liability for defective or unsafe improvements to
real property. If the plaintiff is prohibited from suing a beneficiary of section
12-310 directly, it makes little sense to allow the owner to sue the same
person on a contribution or indemnification claim based upon an implied
contract that is excluded from the statutory scheme."1  Although the legis-
lative history of section 12-310 is silent on this issue, the statutory exemption
for express or implied contract claims as it relates to contribution and in-
demnification actions probably refers to the underlying theory of liability
supporting contribution or indemnity. Thus, for example, an indemnity
claim based on the negligence of a third party is precluded. Conversely, an
indemnity action based on a breach of contract between the indemnitor and
indemnitee is not barred by section 12-3 10.141
A second element of confusion arises from section 12-3 10(b)(2) which pro-
vides that the ten-year limitations period does not apply to any action
brought against the owner or person in actual possession of the real prop-
erty. Literally, this may be interpreted to mean that in any action in which
the owner is sued, the limitations period does not apply to the owner's claim
for contribution or indemnity. If this were the case, the owner could seek
contribution or indemnity any time a claim was filed against him. This in-
terpretation, although arguably supported by a literal reading of the statute,
140. Even without the specific ban of contribution and indemnity claims set forth in § 12-
310(a)(l)(b), if the person from whom contribution of indemnity is sought possesses an immu-
nity against the original plaintiff's claim, contribution and indemnity ordinarily will not be
allowed. See generally W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 8, at § 50; S. SPEISER, supra
note 137, at § 3:22. See also Agus v. Future Chattanooga Dev. Corp., 358 F. Supp. 246 (E.D.
Tenn. 1973) (claim for indemnity barred by Tennessee statute of repose even though statute
did not specifically address indemnity actions). Where potential liability once existed to the
original plaintiff and subsequently is discharged, such as by the expiration of the statute of
limitations, contribution and indemnity may nonetheless be allowed. See, e.g., Keleket X-Ray
Corp. v. United States, 275 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (fact that plaintiff's claim against one
defendant barred by statute of limitations did not preclude contribution claim against this
defendant by another defendant); Tsz Ki Yim v. Home Indemnity Co., 95 F.R.D. 349 (D.D.C.
1982) (indemnity claim proper even though party against whom indemnity sought could not
be held liable to plaintiff because of statute of limitations).
141. A complicating element is introduced if the person from whom indemnity or contribu-
tion is sought is a person in the distributive chain of an allegedly defective product. In such a
case, the theories of contribution or indemnity are likely to be strict liability, negligence, or
breach of warranty. Again, like the injured tenant's claim against the manufacturer, claims of
contribution or indemnity based on strict liability or negligence are not contractual in nature,
and, hence, are not exempted from the statute. In characterizing a claim for contribution or
indemnity premised on an alleged breach of warranty, the analysis applied to the injured ten-
ant's warranty claim is equally applicable.
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is irrational. Although imprecisely stated, the exception set forth in section
(b)(2) was intended to exempt claims brought by a third party against the
persons described in that subsection, but not the owner's claims of contribu-
tion or indemnity. 12
Another question raised by section 12-310 is whether the statute alters the
time within which an owner or other person may file a claim for contribution
or indemnity. A cause of action for contribution normally accrues upon the
party's payment of more than a pro rata portion of a judgment. 14 3 Similarly,
an action for indemnity accrues when the person seeking indemnity pays the
primary liability.'" In the District of Columbia, a claim for contribution or
indemnity is governed by a three-year statute of limitations. 45 Thus, a per-
142. See, e.g., Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983),
where the court, interpreting exclusionary language similar to that in § 12-310, rejected an
interpretation of the North Carolina statute that would allow owners and those in possession
of the realty to bring claims for contribution or indemnity after expiration of the six-year
period set forth in the statute:
[This] result would be wrong for two reasons. First, it would have the effect of giving
owners in possession a more favorable position than third parties who are less able to
discover defects ....
Second, to hold that the six-year limitation affords no protection to designers and
builders from claims brought by those in actual possession and control of realty
would emasculate the statute and destroy the 'repose' that the legislature intended to
give. Third parties injured by defects in improvements cannot claim against archi-
tects, for example, beyond the six-year period under the statute. They can and in all
cases probably would, however, sue persons in possession and control at the time of
the injury. But if persons in possession and control are excluded from the ambit of
the statute, they could crossclaim against the architects for contribution or indem-
nity. Yet the first sentence of the statute expressly prohibits "any action for contri-
bution or indemnity" beyond the six-year period. We think it clear that the
legislature intended to prohibit all claims and crossclaims against designers and
builders filed beyond the six-year period even if these claims or crossclaims are filed
by persons in possession and control. The second sentence is meant to preserve
claims brought against persons in possession and control of an improvement to real
property who might also have designed or built the improvement. If, of course, per-
sons in possession and control neither designed nor built the improvement, then the
first sentence would by its own terms have no application.
308 N.C. at 431, 302 S.E.2d at 975. See also Salesian Soc'y v. Formigli Corp., 120 N.J. Super.
493, 295 A.2d 19 (1972), affid, 124 N.J. Super. 270, 306 A.2d 466 (1973); Good v. Christensen,
527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974). But see Deschamps v. Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc., 113 N.H.
344, 306 A.2d 771 (1973).
143. See, e.g., Bair v. Bryant, 96 A.2d 508, 510 (D.C. Mun. App. 1953). See generally
Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 867, 875-79 (1974).
144. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Windsor, 353 A.2d 684 (D.C. 1976); District
of Columbia v. D.C. Transit System, 248 A.2d 184 (D.C. 1968); Keleket X-Ray Corp. v.
United States, 275 F.2d at 169 (citing general rule); Tsz Ki Yim v. Home Indemnity Co., 95
F.R.D. at 349. See generally, Annot. 57 A.L.R.3d 867 (1974).
145. A cause of action for contribution or indemnity is distinct from the underlying action
for which contribution or indemnity is sought. Several courts have characterized contribution
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son seeking contribution or indemnity normally has three years from the
date of payment of the judgment or primary liability to file a claim.
The language of section 12-310 does not state whether the statute abro-
gates the general statute of limitations governing claims for contribution and
indemnity. The focal point of section 12-310, both for plaintiff's claims and
those for contribution and indemnity, is the relationship between the date of
injury or death and the date the improvement was substantially com-
pleted. 146 The statute does not expressly require that a plaintiff's cause of
action, and claims seeking contribution and indemnity, must be commenced
within this ten-year period.
Despite this omission in the statutory language, the legislative history
clearly reveals Congress' intent to require all claims, including those for con-
tribution and indemnity, to be commenced within the ten-year period set
forth in the statute. 147 For example, an owner who is sued in the ninth year
following completion of the improvement has only one year to file a claim
for contribution or indemnity against a beneficiary of section 12-310, who
might be jointly or wholly liable. If payment of the judgment or primary
liability occurs after the ten-year period following substantial completion of
the improvement, and the payor failed to file a claim for contribution or
indemnity within the time specified by section 12-310, the payor's claim for
contribution or indemnity is time-barred.
claims as being based upon an implied contract and have applied the contract statute of limita-
tions to such claims. See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 927 (1974). A similar analysis would
apply to indemnity actions that also are based on an express or implied contract. The District
of Columiba has a three-year statute of limitations for express or implied contracts. See D.C.
CODE ANN. § 12-301(7) (1981 & Supp. 1985). The District of Columbia also has a residuary
three-year statute of limitations for actions for which "[a] limitation is not otherwise specially
prescribed." See D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(8) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
Where the theory of the contribution or indemnity claim is based upon the warranties pro-
vided by the Uniform Commercial Code, the general rule concerning the statute limitations for
contribution and indemnity claims may conflict with § 2-725 of the Code. That section pro-
vides a four-year statute of limitations for breach of warranty actions and further states that
such actions normally accrue upon "tender or delivery" of the goods. See D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28:2-725 (1981 & Supp. 1985). See also Stanford v. Lesco Assoc., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 812, 813-14 (D.D.C. 1972); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Goudie, 290 A.2d 826, 830
(D.C.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972) (implying that four-year statute of limitations set
forth in § 2-725 would apply if claim had accrued after the effective date of the statute). The
only warranty actions exempted from the four-year statute are for warranties which explicitly
extend to the future performance of the goods. Thus, the time for bringing a breach of war-
ranty action may expire before the time when a contribution or indemnity claim would other-
wise accrue.
146. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310(a)(l)(B) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
147. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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VI. SECTION 12-310: NEED FOR AMENDMENT
As presently drafted, section 12-310 may be interpreted to insulate from
liability all persons other than those identified in subsection (b) of the stat-
ute, if the other statutory prerequisites are satisfied. Such an all-inclusive
reading, however, is undesirable, and the statute should be amended to spe-
cifically delineate those persons who may assert the limitations period em-
bodied in the statute.
148
Various policy reasons have been offered in support of architects' and
builders' statutes of repose. Abolishing the privity defense extended the lia-
bility of design and construction professionals to an unlimited class of third
parties. This unlimited scope of liability is exacerbated by its indefinite dura-
tion. After completing a project, the architect and builder have no control
over the actions of the owner in maintaining the premises. Despite this lack
of control, however, an action can be brought many years after the project is
completed and accepted by the owner. At this point in time, the factor most
likely causing plaintiff's damage is the negligence of the owner in maintain-
ing the premises. Absent a statute of repose, persons participating in the
construction process would be required to defend claims indefinitely, armed
with evidence no doubt faded with the passage of time. 1
49
Proponents of architects' and builders' statutes of repose also cite statisti-
cal studies to justify the existence of these statutes.5 0 These studies suggest
that nearly 98% of all claims against members of the construction industry
are brought within seven years after substantial completion of the project. 5'
148. This has been accomplished in other jurisdictions in one of two ways. The statute
could be amended to expressly list those persons who are within the statute and may raise the
limitations defense. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127(l)(a) (Supp. 1981) (statute ap-
plies only to "architect, contractor, builder or builder vendor, engineer or inspector" perform-
ing certain acts in relation to the construction). See also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Alternatively, subsection (b) of the statute could be amended to list those persons who are not
within the statute. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.01-250 (1984) (manufacturers and suppliers of
products specifically excluded).
149. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1274, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972); Hearing Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Business, Commerce, and Judiciary of the Committee on the District of Columbia,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8, 10-12, 15, 18 (1972); 118 CONG. REC. 36,939 (1972). See also Hear-
ing Before House of Representatives Subcomm. No. I of the Comm. on the District of Columbia,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-26 (1967).
150. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Business, Commerce, and Judiciary
of the Comm. on the District of Columbia, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 19 (1972); 118 CONG. REC.
36,941 (1972). See also Hearing Before House of Representatives Subcomm. No. 1 of the
Comm. on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1967).
151. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Business, Commerce, and Judiciary
of the Comm. on the District of Columbia, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1972); Hearing Before House
of Representatives Subcomm. No. 1 of the Comm. on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., Ist
Sess. 27-28 (1967).
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Statutory provisions such as section 12-310, which allow more than seven
years to commence an action, purportedly strike an appropriate balance be-
tween the policies of repose and a person's right to pursue a remedy.
The stated rationales underlying architects' and builders' statutes of re-
pose are not free from doubt. The evidentiary problems confronting the ben-
eficiaries of these statutes when actions are commenced many years after
completion of the improvement plague potential plaintiffs and defendants
alike, and provide little support for a policy choice granting certain defend-
ants immunity from suit. Additionally, although the majority of claims
against architects and builders may be commenced prior to the limitations
period established by the statute of repose, some meritorious claims doubt-
lessly arise after this time period has elapsed. Finally, if 98% of all plaintiffs'
claims are brought against members of the construction industry within
seven years after substantial completion of the improvement, the fear that
absent a statute of repose these potential defendants will be forced to defend
claims indefinitely is exaggerated.
Whatever the merits of a policy insulating architects, builders, and other
persons directly involved in the construction process from liability after a
certain period of time, the arguments in support of this policy are even less
persuasive when applied to parties such as manufacturers,' 52 whose only
connection with the construction is the inclusion of their products in the
structural improvement. Like the architect and builder, the manufacturer
has no control over the owner whose negligent maintenance may allow the
product to deteriorate to a dangerous condition. But here the similarities
between architects and builders, on the one hand, and manufacturers, on the
other hand, largely disappear. Manufacturers are best able to allocate the
risk of defective or unsafe products to the public at large. Indeed, this no-
tion of efficient risk allocation lies at the heart of strict liability in tort.
15 3
Rather than imposing the loss attributable to a defective or unsafe product
on the individual, manufacturers may distribute this loss most efficiently to
the general population.
1 5 4
152. Use of the term "manufacturer" in this context includes all those persons in the prod-
uct's distribution chain.
153. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965); W.
PROSSER, supra note 8, at § 97.
154. The nature of the manufacturer's business renders it better able to efficiently distribute
loss than members of the construction industry. "Unlike mass manufacturing products, there
is no mass consumption of building projects over which to spread the economic risk of liabil-
ity." Collins, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-An Examination of
Constitutionality, 29 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 41, 67 (1978).
Several states have enacted product liability statutes of repose to provide a time period
within which actions against the manufacturer of defective products must be commenced. See,
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Further, manufacturers occupy a role qualitatively different from that of
members of the construction industry. Manufacturers produce and dis-
tribute standardized products and, through standardized processes, are best
able to monitor quality control. Building design and construction profes-
sionals, on the other hand, have little opportunity to pretest their ideas and
services. 155
In addition to delineating those persons who are exempt from the statute,
e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1980) (twelve-year statute of repose); COL. REV. STAT.
§ 13-80-127.6(l)(b) (Supp. 1984) (ten-year statue of repose); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
577(a) (West Supp. 1985) (same). See generally McGovern, supra note 6. Congress is also
considering products liability legislation that would create uniform national standards gov-
erning products liability litigation. See S. 44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983) introduced by Sena-
tor Kasten ("Kasten bill") and H.R. 2729, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) introduced by Rep.
Shumway ("Shumway bill"). The Kasten and Shumway bills are outgrowths of the Model
Uniform Products Liability Act drafted by the Department of Commerce. See Model Uniform
Products Liability Act, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
Both the Kasten and Shumway bills contain a repose provision. Subject to certain excep-
tions, the Kasten bill requires all actions for harms allegedly caused by a defect in the design or
warning of a capital good be brought within 25 years from the time the product was first
delivered. See S. 44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 11 (1983). Similarly, the Shumway bill, also sub-
ject to certain exceptions, requires all product related actions to be commenced within 10 years
after the sale of the product. See H.R. 2729, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 12 (1983). However, even
assuming that a repose period applicable to products liability actions is justified, such a limita-
tions period should be the result of explicit debate, not the unforeseen consequence of a statu-
tory provision such as § 12-310.
155. Suppliers and manufacturers, who typically supply and produce components in
large quantities, make standard goods and develop standard processes. They can
thus maintain high quality control standards in the controlled environment of the
factory. On the other hand, the architect or contractor can pre-test and standardize
construction designs and plans only in a limited fashion. In addition, the inspection,
supervision and observation of construction by architects and contractors involves
individual expertise not susceptible of the quality control standards of the factory.
Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So.2d 1381, 1386 (La. 1978). See also
McMacken v. State, 320 N.W.2d 131, 135, a.ffd on rehearing, 325 N.W.2d 60 (S.D. 1982);
Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 277, 382 A.2d 715, 719 (1978).
One commentator suggests manufacturers should be considered among the beneficiaries of
statutes of repose for architects and builders depending upon both the role the product plays in
the improvement and the theory upon which the manufacturer is sued:
A sound approach is that the statute should protect a manufacturer of machinery or
construction materials that are necessary in order for the improvement to function as
it was intended. A manufacturer should be protected, however, only to the extent he
is accused of faulty design, supervision, planning, or construction of the machine.
When he is accused of faulty manufacture of the machine, or of faulty warnings or
instructions with regard thereto, and those activities take place at a plant away from
the construction site, a manufacturer should not be immune. Nor would a manufac-
turer be immune under this analysis when the machine-even if it is a 'fixture'-is
not required for the use of the improvement by the owner.
Rogers, supra note 6, at 13-14. See also Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, cert.
denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977). Yet it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to distinguish between claims of "faulty design . . . or construction of the machine" that
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other portions of section 12-310 also require clarification. A definition or
listing of the "express or implied contracts" exempted from the statute's op-
eration is necessary to determine which actions the statute governs. Simi-
larly, the statute currently is confusing concerning whether claims for
contribution and indemnity are barred when an action is brought against the
owner or other person in possession of the realty. Although this was the
likely intent of the draftsmen, this intent is imprecisely stated in the statute.
There also is a need to specify the relationship between section 12-3 10 and
the various statutes of limitations set forth in the District of Columbia Code.
In its present form, the statute is silent concerning whether it requires a
plaintiff's action and a defendant's claims for contribution and indemnity to
be actually commenced within ten years following substantial completion of
the improvement. The legislative history of section 12-310 strongly suggests
that this is the case.1 56 Nevertheless, if the statute is intended to require all
such claims to be filed within this period, this intent easily can be reflected in
the statutory language.
Finally, the statute should be amended to provide a grace period for
claims that accrue near the expiration of the ten-year period established by
section 12-310. Indeed, the absence of such a grace period may render sec-
tion 12-310 unconstitutional.'5 7 If the statute is interpreted to require that
all claims must be commenced within ten years of substantial completion of
the improvement, a person injured on the day before the tenth anniversary of
completion has only one day in which to file suit. Most analogous statutes in
other jurisdictions provide grace periods that permit persons whose cause of
action would otherwise be extinguished almost immediately by the statute of
repose a reasonable length of time in which to file suit.
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 12-310
Section 12-310 poses several constitutional issues. In its present form, or
as amended to exclude from its operation actions against manufacturers and
other persons not directly involved in the construction process, the statute
distinguishes among potential classes of defendants. Some of these defend-
ants are granted immunity from suit while others are not given immunity.
The classification scheme inherent in section 12-310 is vulnerable on equal
protection grounds.
The statute is subject to constitutional challenge for other reasons as well.
would allow the manufacturer to raise the statute, from claims of "faulty manufacture of the
machine" that are outside the statute's protection.
156. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 202-07.
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The statute effectively forecloses any cause of action ten years after substan-
tial completion of the improvement irrespective of the date of injury or
death. The statute thus may eliminate, even before a party has suffered in-
jury or death, a cause of action that otherwise would be actionable.15 Fur-
ther, to the extent the injury or death occurs near the expiration of the ten-
year period established in the statute, section 12-310 also may deprive liti-
gants of a reasonable time period in which to file suit before their claim is
extinguished. These consequences raise due process concerns.1 59
In President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Madden,"6 the United
States District Court for Maryland examined the constitutionality of section
12-310, and concluded the statute withstood constitutional scrutiny. Thus,
the court joined the majority of courts in other jurisdictions that have found
similar statutes of repose to be a proper exercise of legislative authority.'61
158. This consequence has prompted some courts questioning the validity of these statutes
to cite Judge Frank's dissent in Dincher v. Marlin, 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952):
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived, or be divorced
before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a house never
built, or miss a train running on a nonexistent railroad. For substantially similar
reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as a sort of legal 'axiom,' that a
statute of limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action before that cause
of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Canton Lutheran Church v. Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 F. Supp. 873,
876 n.5 (D.S.D. 1981). See also McMacken v. State, 320 N.W.2d 131, 141, afl'd on rehearing,
325 N.W.2d 60 (S.D. 1982) (Henderson, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 899 comment g (1979). Cf Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288,
295 (1983) (New Hampshire products liability statute of repose unconstitutional).
159. The analysis used to determine whether a particular statute violates the due process or
equal protection provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Con-
stitution is largely the same. Where no fundamental right is implicated, the relevant due pro-
cess inquiry centers upon whether the law arguably is rationally related to a legitimate
legislative objective. Only when the legislation infringes upon a specific civil liberty such as the
freedom of speech will the court scrutinize the basis for the legislation more carefully.
The analysis used to determine whether a statute violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment is virtually identical. If the statute involves no fundamental right or
suspect class, the classification scheme created by the statute does not violate the equal protec-
tion clause provided that the classification rationally relates to a legitimate legislative purpose.
Conversely, "strict scrutiny" is required if the statute touches upon a fundamental right or
suspect class. In the past several years, the Supreme Court also has developed an intermediate
standard of review between the "rational basis" and "strict scrutiny" tests. See generally J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 12, § III(A), ch. 16 § 11(C)
(2d ed. 1983).
160. 505 F. Supp. 557 (D. Md. 1980), affid in part and appeal dismissed in part, 660 F.2d
91 (4th Cir. 1981).
161. See Cournoyer v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 744 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1984); Brown v.
M.W. Kellogg Co., 743 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1984); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Dykes, Gooden-
berger, Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1984); Hasty v. Rust Eng'g Co., 726 F.2d
1068 (5th Cir. 1984); Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504 (8th Cir.
1983); Skeen v. Monsanto Co., 569 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Adair v. Koopers Co., 541
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In President and Directors, plaintiff argued that section 12-310 violated the
F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1982), affd, 741 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1984); Cudahy Co. v. Ragnar
Benson, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1212 (D.C. Colo. 1981); Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp.
698 (W.D. Va. 1974); Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal
dismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971); Bamhouse v. City of Pinole, 133 Cal. App. 3d 171, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 881 (1982); Salinero v. Pon, 124 Cal. App. 3d 120, 177 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1981); Wagner v.
State, 86 Cal. App. 3d 922, 150 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1978); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d
822 (Colo. 1982); Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Constr. Co., 462 A.2d 416 (Del.
Super. 1983); Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. J.G. Wilson Corp., 250 Ga. 691, 300
S.E.2d 507 (1983); Mullis v. Southern Co. Servs., 250 Ga. 90, 296 S.E.2d 579 (1982); Twin
Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341 (1982); Matayka v.
Melia, 119 Ill. App. 3d 221, 74 Ill. Dec. 851, 456 N.E.2d 353 (1983) (subsequent to amend-
ment of Illinois statute); Beecher v. White, 447 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Carney v.
Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1982); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d
1381 (La. 1978); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); O'Brien v. Hazelet
& Erdal Consulting Eng'r, 410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980); Calder v. City of Crystal, 318
N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982) (subsequent to amendment of Minnesota statute); Anderson v. Fred
Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr., Inc., 402 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 1981); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170
Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d
662 (1972); Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 645 P.2d 1375 (1982)
(statute does not violate equal protection, however, in light of the particular facts of the case,
does deny due process); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, cert. denied sub nom.
Albuquerque v. Howell, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977); Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp.,
308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983); 11:. 3amble Deaconess Home Assoc. v. Turner Constr.
Co., 14 Ohio App. 3d 281, 470 N.E.2d 950 (1984); Joseph v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203
(1971); Freezer Storage, Inc., v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978);
McMacken v. State, 320 N.W.2d 131, affid on rehearing, 325 N.W.2d 60 (S.D. 1982); Harmon
v. Angus R. Jessup Assoc., 619 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1981); Sowders v. M.W. Kellog Co., 663
S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983); Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 802, rehearing denied, 459 U.S. 1059 (1982); Hill v.
Forrest & Cotton, Inc., 555 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (writ ref'd n.r.e.); Good v.
Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974); Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating
& Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Wesley,
100 Wis. 2d 59, 301 N.W.2d 271 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (subsequent to amendment of Wiscon-
sin statute), modified on appeal, 105 Wis. 2d 305, 313 N.W.2d 833 (1982) (Supreme Court did
not reach constitutional issue). See generally Collins, Limitation of Action Statutes for Archi-
tects and Builders-An Examination of Constitutionality, 29 FED'N INS. COUN. Q. 41 (1978);
Knapp & Lee, supra note 6, at 351; McGovern, supra note 6, at 579; Rogers, supra note 6, at 1;
Sisson & Kelley, Statutes of Limitations for the Design and Building Professions-Will They
Survive Constitutional Attack, 49 INS. COUNS. J. 243 (1982); Comment, Defective Design, supra
note 6, at 87; Comment, Limitation of Action, supra note 6, at 361; Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 1242
(1979).
The constitutional questions raised by statutes of repose for architects and builders are simi-
lar to those surrounding state medical malpractice and products liability statutes of repose.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1975) (medical malpractice statute of repose); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 95.1 l(4)(b) (1982) (same); MD. Crs. & JUD. PRoC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1984) (same).
See also supra note 149 and accompanying text. See generally McGovern, supra note 6, at 579.
Courts are divided on the constitutionality of these statutes as well. Compare Kennedy v.
Cumberland Eng'r Corp., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984) (Rhode Island products liability statute of
repose violates open access to courts provision of state constitution); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983) (New Hampshire product liability statute of repose
unconstitutional); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (New Hampshire
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fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. The
court framed the relevant issue as follows:
The question arises as to whether the different treatment accorded
to builders, architects, engineers, and other design professionals en-
gaged in improvements to real property on the one hand, and own-
ers, occupiers and suppliers on the other hand, is valid. The
former group is benefited by the limitation on liability granted by
section 12-310; the latter group is not so benefited, and the liability
of its members is not so limited. 162
In answering this question, the court noted the United States Supreme
Court had dismissed an earlier appeal from the Supreme Court of Arkansas,
Carter v. Hartenstein, 163 for lack of a substantial federal question. The prin-
cipal issue presented in Carter concerned the constitutionality of a statute of
repose analogous to section 12-310. The court in President and Directors
cited the Supreme Court's dismissal of Carter as precedent supporting the
constitutional validity of statutes of repose similar to section 12-310.'64 The
medical statute of repose unconstitutional); with Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d
527 (7th Cir. 1983) (Indiana product liability statute of repose constitutional), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 2690 (1984); Mathis v. Eli Lilly Co., 719 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983) (Tennessee product
liability statute of repose constitutional); Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982)
(Minnesota medical malpractice statute of repose did not violate due process).
For a thorough review of the constitutional issues raised by statutes of repose such as § 12-
310, see McGovern, supra note 6, at 579. There, the author observes that the constitutional
analysis employed by most courts to date in examining statutes of repose has been less than
satisfactory:
The treatment of these [constitutional] issues by state appellate courts generally has
been unilluminating. The opinions tend to be conclusory and founded upon unar-
ticulated rationales. The definition that a court gives to the statute under constitu-
tional attack often is dispositive.
Id. at 581. Of course, to the extent that a statute is challenged on equal protection and due
process grounds, this criticism is perhaps more a function of current equal protection-due
process analysis than a conscious abandonment by courts of rigorous constitutional review.
Under the current "tiered" equal protection-due process framework, statutes are assigned min-
imum, intermediate, or strict review. Once the appropriate standard is selected, the outcome
in most instances is assured. Statutes involving economic regulation almost invariably are
upheld as a valid exercise of legislative authority; statutes touching upon fundamental rights or
suspect classes merit strict scrutiny that nearly always proves to be "strict" in theory but
"fatal" in fact. No such predictability is associated with intermediate review, which is reserved
for classifications involving important, but not fundamental, rights. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 16-2, 16-3, 16-6, 16-30 (1978).
162. 505 F. Supp. at 577 (referring to D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310(b)(2) (1981 & Supp.
1985). The court's dicta that suppliers may not raise the limitations period set forth in § 12-
310 is not free from doubt. The court's citation to § 12-3 10(b)(2) in support of this statement
is overstated. That provision excepts only the person, who at the time of the injury or death,
"[w]as the owner of or in actual possession or control of such real property."
163. 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971).
164. "A summary dismissal of a case for want of a substantial federal question is a decision
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court applied the customary two-tiered equal protection-due process analy-
sis, and concluded that section 12-310 bore a rational relationship to the
legislature's goals:
After 'applying principles established by prior [Supreme Court] de-
cisions,' this Court concludes that section 12-310 is constitutional.
Section 12-310 is an economic regulation and does not focus on
either a fundamental right or a suspect class. It therefore does not
merit strict scrutiny and passes muster under the rational basis
test. In sum, this Court concludes that the classifications con-
structed by section 12-310 are rational, and that section 12-310
does not violate any provisions of the federal constitution., 65
Other federal precedent is virtually unanimous in upholding the validity
of architects' and builders' statutes of repose.166 State decisional law, how-
ever, is more evenly divided. The majority of state courts that have consid-
ered the constitutionality of their respective statutes of repose have sustained
the validity of these statutes. 167 On the other hand, a substantial minority of
state courts have found to the contrary, concluding that these statutes im-
permissibly infringe upon constitutional guarantees.
1 68
by the United States Supreme Court on the merits of that case which this Court is not free to
disregard." 505 F. Supp. at 578. A constitutional challenge to to the analogous Texas statute
of repose also was dismissed for want of substantial federal question. See Ellerbe v. Otis Eleva-
tor Co., 618 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981, appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 802, rehearing de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1059 (1982). In sustaining the validity of the Texas statute, the Fifth Circuit
cited the Supreme Court's dismissal of Ellerbe as binding precedent. See Hasty v. Rust Eng'g
Co., 726 F.2d 1068, 1070 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes,
Gooden, Berger, Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1984).
165. 505 F. Supp. at 578-80.
166. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. Only one federal court expressly has
found such a statute constitutionally defective. In McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., the
court concluded that the Colorado statute violated equal protection clause of the federal con-
stitution as well as state constitutional provisions. 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1344-46 (D. Colo. 1980).
Later, however, the Colorado Supreme Court, faced with a constitutional attack of the same
statute, subsequently upheld the validity of the Colorado statute and expressly declined to
adopt the reasoning of McClanahan. See Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 828 n.8
(Colo. 1982) (en banc). Further, another federal judge in the same judicial district as McClan-
ahan refused to adopt that decision and, instead, found the statute constitutionally permissible.
See Cudahy Co. v. Ragnar Benson, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1212, 1216-17 (D. Colo. 1981). See also
Canton Lutheran Church v. Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 F. Supp. 873 (D.S.D.
1981) (implying that the South Dakota statute was unconstitutional but not reaching this is-
sue). See also In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 929 (1983) (interpreting Kentucky law; Kentucky statute unconstitutional based
upon state constitutions; but see Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky stat-
ute constitutional).
167. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
168. See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 929 (1983) (interpreting Kentucky law); Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So.
2d 725 (Ala. 1983); Plant v. R.L. Reid Co., 294 Ala. 155, 313 So. 2d 518 (1975); Bagby Eleva-
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In cases where architects' and builders' statutes of repose have been de-
clared unconstitutional, the court's decision often rests on a peculiar provi-
sion of the state constitution, rather than on a violation of the federal
Constitution. Courts have found their respective statutes unconstitutional
on the basis of the state constitution's equal protection,'69 special legisla-
tion' 7 ° or open court provisions, 171 vagueness, 72 and other guarantees pro-
vided by state law. i73 Some courts, however, have found that the statute in
question conflicts with federal constitutional mandates as well.'
74
tor & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306 (1974); Overland Const. Co. v.
Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 65 Hawaii 26, 647
P.2d 276 (1982); Pacific Indemn. Co. v. Thompson-Yeager, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.
1977); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 660 P.2d 995 (1983);
Antoniou v. Kenick, 124 N.H. 606, 474 A.2d 566 (1984); Henderson Clay Prods., Inc. v.
Edgar Wood & Assocs., 122 N.H. 800, 451 A.2d 174 (1982); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge
1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Dangaard v. Baltic Co-Op Bldg. & Supply Ass'n,
349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225
N.W.2d 454 (1975); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc.,
611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980).
The lack of consensus concerning the constitutionality of these statutes is vividly portrayed
by several decisions examining the South Dakota statute. In Canton Lutheran Church v.
Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 F. Supp. 873 (D.S.D. 1981), the court implied that
the statute was unconstitutional, but declined to reach this issue. Shortly thereafter, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota upheld the statute from constitutional attack in McMacken v.
State, 320 N.W.2d 131, af'd on rehearing, 325 N.W.2d 60 (S.D. 1982), a result also reached by
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. See Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmer's Elevator
Co., 716 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1983). Still later, in Dangaard v. Baltic Co-Op Bldg. & Supply
Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984), the Supreme Court of South Dakota overruled
McMacken, and found the South Dakota statute unconstitutional because it violated the "open
court" provision of the state constitution.
169. See, e.g., Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 65 Hawaii 26, 647 P.2d 276 (1982);
Henderson Clay Prods. v. Edgar Wood & Assocs., 122 N.H. 800, 451 A.2d 174 (1982) (New
Hampshire statute violates both federal and state constitutions); State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 660 P.2d 995 (1983).
170. See, e.g., Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Phillips v. ABC
Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980) (Wyoming statute provides special immunity and
also violates state constitution).
171. See, e.g., Jackson v. Mannesman Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1983); Overland
Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Saylor v. E.H. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.
1973); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980) (Wyoming statute violates
special legislation and open court provisions of state constitution).
172. See, e.g., Plant v. R.L. Reid Co., 294 Ala. 155, 313 So. 2d 518 (1975).
173. See, e.g., Bagby Elevator Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306 (1974) (title of
statute does not clearly express subject; body of statute contains two subjects); Kallas
Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975) (Wisconsin statute
violates federal equal protection and provision of state constitution guaranteeing every person
a remedy).
174. See, e.g., Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 660 P.2d 995 (1983) (statute violates both federal
and state equal protection guarantees); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563
P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Henderson Clay Prods. v. Edgar Wood & Assocs., 122 N.H. 800, 451
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The earliest decision striking a statute of repose analogous to section 12-
310 is that of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Skinner v. Anderson.175 In
Skinner, plaintiff brought suit against various parties, including an architect,
who allegedly failed to design a building with proper ventilation. The trial
court dismissed the defendant-architect on the basis of the Illinois architects'
and builders' statute of repose. On appeal, plaintiff argued the statute was
unconstitutional. The appellate court held the state statute violated a provi-
sion of the Illinois constitution that prohibited special legislation granting
immunity to certain classes of persons.1 76 The classification scheme created
by the statute-between those immunized from liability and those who were
not-was deemed unrelated to any legitimate legislative purpose.'
7 7
Following Skinner, other state courts found their respective statutes of
repose constitutionally defective. In Fujioka v. Kam, 17' for example, the
court was confronted with a constitutional attack on the Hawaiian archi-
tects' and builders' statute of repose. Although the court acknowledged that
the legislature may change or abrogate common law remedies, 179 the court
held that the statute in question violated both federal and state equal protec-
tion mandates because it arbitrarily differentiated potential classes of
defendants:
Stated another way, the cause of the injuries is the same, the plain-
tiff is the same and injuries are the same-but under the statute the
plaintiff may not recover from the engineer and the contractor even
A.2d 174 (1982) (statute violates both federal and state equal protection guarantees); Kallas
Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975) (statute violates
federal equal protection as well as provision of state constitution guaranteeing every person a
remedy).
175. 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
176. The specific constitutional provision violated in Skinner provided:
The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following
enumerated cases, that is to say: for. . . Granting to any corporation, association or
individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.
38 I11. 2d at 459, 231 N.E.2d at 590.
177. Id. at 460, 231 N.E.2d at 591. Although the plaintiff also challenged the Illinois stat-
ute on federal constitutional grounds, the court expressly based its decision on Illinois consti-
tution, and reserved judgment on the other constitutional claims advanced. Id. at 458, 231
N.E.2d at 590.
In dicta, the court also implied manufacturers and suppliers were not within the class of
persons protected by the Illinois statute:
If, for example, four years after a building is completed a cornice should fall be-
cause the adhesive used was defective, the manufacturer of the adhesive is granted no
immunity. And so it is with all others who furnish materials used in constructing the
improvement.
Id. at 460, 231 N.E.2d at 591.
178. 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973).
179. Id. at 10, 514 P.2d at 570.
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though the negligence of the engineer and the contractor may have
been the sole proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the plain-
tiff. However, the plaintiff may recover damages from the owners,
and the owners will have no right to have the engineer and the
contractor reimburse or contribute to them the amount of damages
they are required to pay the plaintiff. We are unable to see any
rational basis for treating the engineer and the contractor differ-
ently from the owners under the same circumstances.
1 80
Although Fujioka and other courts have invalidated architects' and build-
ers' statutes of repose because they deny equal protection, attacks based on
due process guarantees have been less successful. 181 Several courts have re-
lied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Silver v. Silver 182 to sustain the
validity of these statutes of repose against claims that they deny due process
by eliminating before the occurrence of the injury or death a claim that
otherwise would be actionable.
183
In Silver, the Court held that a Connecticut statute that abolished a cause
of action by automobile guests against owners and operators did not violate
the equal protection clause. In dicta, the Court opined that the Connecticut
statute did not violate due process by abolishing a common law right of
action. 184
Several state legislatures have amended and reenacted their statutes of re-
pose for architects and builders after the statutes were declared unconstitu-
tional.1 85  These amendments allegedly were designed to alleviate the
180. Id. at 12, 514 P.2d at 571. The question before the court was whether the statute
violated "[a]ny provision of the Hawaii State Constitution or the United States Constitution."
Id. at 10, 514 P.2d at 570. In answering this question in the affirmative, the court does not
state whether the basis of its opinion is a violation of the state or federal constitution, or both.
Since the court cites both federal and state precedent in support of its analysis, presumably the
statute was deemed constitutionally infirm in both respects.
181. See generally McGovern, supra note 6, at 613. The author notes that "no state appel-
late court . . . has relied solely upon due process to overturn a product liability statute of
repose." Id.
182. 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
183. See, e.g., President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Madden, 505 F. Supp. 557,
578 (D. Md.), afl'd in part and appeal dismissed in part, 660 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1981); Adair v.
Koppers Co., 541 F. Supp. 1120, 1128 (N.D. Ohio 1982), afl'd, 741 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1984).
184. "We need not, therefore, elaborate the rule that the Constitution does not forbid the
creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a
permissible legislative objective." 280 U.S. at 122 (1969). See also Duke Power Co. v. Caro-
lina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978) (citing Second Employers' Lia-
bility Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912) ("[a] person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule
of the common law.")). See also Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 908 (1985) (Tennessee products liability statute of repose
constitutional).
185. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 657-8 (Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051
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constitutional infirmities declared by the state's judiciary. In fact, some of
these statutory amendments made no substantive changes to the prior
law."8 6 In Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii Ltd.,'87 the Supreme Court of
Hawaii declared the Hawaiian statute of repose, which had been amended
after the court's opinion in Fujioka, unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds. 188
Although a substantial minority of state courts have invalidated archi-
tects' and builders' statutes of repose, the doctrinal analysis employed by the
majority of courts in sustaining these statutes from constitutional challenge
is anchored on more substantial footing, at least on the basis of federal con-
stitutional principles. Decisions invalidating these statutes often appear to
mask a subtle judicial hostility toward the practical effect of these statutes of
repose. Unlike traditional statutes of limitations, which punish the dilatory
plaintiff, statutes of repose may bar a cause of action regardless of how
promptly a grievant may attempt to perfect his legal remedy. In addition,
statutes of repose permit some potential defendants to escape liability, while
allowing the action to proceed against others, merely because a certain
amount of time has passed following substantial completion of the
improvement.
Despite judicial reluctance to embrace statutes of repose such as section
12-310, the better view is that these statutes are a constitutional exercise of
legislative authority. The authority of legislatures to abolish or modify ex-
isting common law causes of actions is established beyond peradventure."8 9
Moreover, statutes are not rendered unconstitutional merely because they
treat some defendants differently than others. Of course, both in eliminating
(West Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 109-110 (West Supp. 1984-1985); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 893.89 (West 1983). After the Florida statute was declared unconstitutional in
Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979), the statute was reenacted without
revision, but with a preamble setting forth the legislature's intention. See Act of July 2, 1980,
ch. 80-322, 1980 FLA. LAWS 1389, 1390 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(c) (West
1982)). See also The Crumbling Tower of Architectural Immunity, supra note 8, at 226.
186. See generally Knapp & Lee, supra note 6, at 365; Comment, Defective Design, supra
note 6, at 103.
187. 65 Hawaii 26, 647 P.2d 276 (1982).
188. Id. at 43-45, 647 P.2d at 288. Other courts, however, have found the amended stat-
utes constitutional. See, e.g., Matayka v. Melia, 119 Ill. App. 3d 221, 456 N.E.2d 353 (1983)
(amended Illinois statute constitutional); Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn.
1982) (amended Minnesota statute constitutional); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Wesley, 100
Wis. 2d 59, 301 N.W.2d 271 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (amended Wisconsin statute constitutional),
modified on appeal, 105 Wis. 2d 305, 313 N.W.2d 833 (1982) (court did not reach constitu-
tional issue).
189. See supra note 184 and accompanying text; see also Adair v. Koppers, Co., 541 F.
Supp. 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662
(1972).
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traditional common law rights and in distinguishing classes of defendants,
the legislature must act rationally to further some permissible objective. It is
here where the battle concerning the constitutionality of these statutes is
waged.
The legislative history of section 12-310 demonstrates Congress' intent to
limit the potentially indefinite liability of persons involved in the design and
construction of improvements to real property. In support of the bill's pas-
sage, proponents of the legislation cited specific cases that demonstrated the
need to adopt a time limitation for actions arising from allegedly unsafe or
defective improvements to real property.1 90 In enacting section 12-310,
Congress chose a rational means to eliminate a perceived problem.
Although the validity of the assumptions underlying statutes of repose such
as section 12-310 may be subject to some question, 9 ' whether Congress
chose the wisest or most desirable course is irrelevant to the constitutional
inquiry. 
192
Section 12-310 also is not constitutionally defective because it distin-
guishes potential classes of defendants. Because the statute involves neither
a fundamental right nor suspect class, the relevant examination hinges upon
whether the classification scheme inherent in the statute is rationally related
to a legitimate legislative objective.
In connection with section 12-310, Congress considered the disparate po-
sitions of those involved in the construction process who may invoke the
statute, and owners of realty who are specifically exempted from the statute's
operation. 193 The former have no control over the improvement once it is
accepted by the owner.'9 a Owners, on the other hand, through proper main-
tenance and supervision, are in the best position to protect the improvement
from dangerous or unsafe conditions that may develop over time. In view of
the owner's control over the improvement, section 12-310 does not deny
equal protection of the law. Simply stated, owners of the realty occupy a
position dissimilar to those who may invoke the statute, and this different
position justifies different treatment under the statute.195
190. See 118 CONG. REC. 36,939 (1972).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 152-55.
192. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); Daniel v. Family Security Life
Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)
("A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify it.").
193. See S. REP. No. 1274, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972); 118 CONG. REC. 36,939 (1972).
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork, Co., 476 Pa. 270, 276-78, 382 A.2d
715, 718 (1978); Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 435-38, 302 S.E.2d 868,
877-78 (1983); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); Beecher v. White,
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Other factors not expressly reflected in the legislative history of section 12-
310 have been cited by courts upholding the constitutionality of architects'
and builders' statutes of repose. The potential scope of liability between de-
sign and construction professionals and owners differs appreciably. Owners
are liable to others who come onto their land while architects, builders, and
others involved in the construction process may be liable to both owners and
others who use the land. 196 Further, the owner's liability typically lies only
in tort and is subject to various common law rules limiting liability, such as
"undiscovered trespassers" and "mere licensees."' 97 Design and construc-
tion professionals, on the other hand, may be liable for construction defects
under various legal theories. These theories include contract, warranty, neg-
ligence, and, perhaps, strict liability in tort. 9 In addition, their liability is
not diminished by common law rules that may limit the owner's responsibil-
ity.' 99 Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, an owner's liability gener-
ally ceases once ownership is transferred. Liability of those involved in the
construction process is coextensive with the life of the structure.
Not only does scope of liability differ between owners and design and con-
struction professionals, architects' and builders' statutes of repose may in-
duce certain public benefits. Design and construction innovation may entail
increased risk. Although perhaps not empirically verifiable, limiting the po-
tential liability of construction industry members may encourage innovation
in design and construction techniques. 2"
Amending the statute specifically to exclude from its operation manufac-
447 N.E.2d 622, 626 (Ind. App. 1983); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d
1381, 1385 (La. 1978); see also Overland Const. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979),
where the dissent, citing the findings of the House Report accompanying an earlier version of
§ 12-310 that failed to pass Congress noted: "If the [Florida] legislature in enacting [the Flor-
ida statute], had made findings similar to those [of the United States House of Representa-
tives], there could be little doubt that it would have shown an overpowering public necessity
and the absence of a less onerous alternative." Id. at 577 (Alderman, J., dissenting).
196. Beecher v. White, 447 N.E.2d 622, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Freezer Storage, Inc. v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715, 718 (1978).
197. Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d 1381, 1385-86 (La. 1978);
Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, 220, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1979);
Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 270, 382 A.2d 715, 718 (1978).
198. See generally The Crumbling Tower of Architectural Immunity, supra note 8, at 246-
50.
199. See, e.g., Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork, Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715,
718 (1978).
200. See, e.g., Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 828 n.7 (Colo. 1982); O'Brien
v. Hazelet & Erdal Consulting Eng'r, 410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336, 342 (1980); Lamb v.
Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868, 878 (1983). One commentator, how-
ever, suggests that architects' and builders' statutes of repose actually may discourage rather
than encourage preventive design and care since the statute eliminates the threat of liability
after a certain number of years. See Comment, Defective Design, supra note 6, at 93. Never-
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turers and other persons located at the fringe of the construction process
also raises no substantial constitutional concerns. These parties, like the
owner of the realty, occupy a position wholly dissimilar to persons such as
architects and builders. Manufacturers and other persons in a product's dis-
tribution chain can most efficiently spread the risk of defective products to
the general population. In addition, unlike architects and other persons in
the construction industry, manufacturers can pretest their products.2 ' The
disparate positions of these parties justify different treatment under section
12-310.
Even though section 12-310 generally satisfies all constitutional require-
ments, there exists one situation in which the statute may deny due process.
Currently, section 12-310 provides no grace period for claims arising near
the expiration of the ten-year period established by the statute. If the statute
is interpreted to require all claims to be filed within ten years after substan-
tial completion of the improvement, a person injured on the 364th day of the
ninth year following substantial completion of the improvement has only one
day in which to file suit. Many analogous statutes in other jurisdictions pro-
vide a special grace period for claims that arise near the expiration of the
time set forth in the statute of repose.20 2 The effect of these grace periods is
to allow a party who possesses a cause of action that otherwise would be
precluded by the statute to commence an action after the time limit estab-
lished by the statute.20 3 Thus, in the example of the person injured on the
last day before the statute of repose normally would bar all claims, the per-
son typically is given one more year in which to file suit.
In Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Commission,2° the plaintiff argued
that the New Mexico architects' and builders' statute of repose was uncon-
stitutional because it did not provide sufficient time to file suit for persons
whose cause of action accrued near the expiration of the period set forth in
the statute. The New Mexico statute2" 5 required all actions arising from
defective or unsafe improvements to real property to be commenced within
theless, building codes, licensing requirements, and regulation of members of the construction
industry appear sufficient to deter this concern.
201. See, e.g., Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918, 920, appeal dismissed,
401 U.S. 901 (1971); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 828 (Colo. 1982);
Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d 1381, 1386 (La. 1978); Klein v. Cata-
lano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d
647, 651 (1976); Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 878 (1983);
Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, 220, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1979);
Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork, Co., 476 Pa. 270, 270, 382 A.2d 715, 719 (1978).
202. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
203. Id.
204. 98 N.M. 119, 645 P.2d 1375 (1982).
205. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27 (1984).
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ten years of substantial completion of the improvement and, like section 12-
310, provided no grace period for claims accruing near the end of this ten-
year period. The death forming the basis of plaintiff's action in Terry oc-
cuffed three months before expiration of the ten-year statute of repose.
20 6
The court held that since the plaintiff possessed only three months to file suit
before the statute of repose extinguished his cause of action, the statute de-
prived him of a reasonable amount of time to pursue a remedy and, accord-
ingly, violated his due process rights. Terry provides persuasive support for
the adding a grace period to section 12-310.2o7
VIII. CONCLUSION
The abolition of traditional defenses insulating members of the construc-
tion industry from liability prompted many states to enact special legislation
establishing a finite period during which these persons may be liable. These
architects' and builders' statutes of repose differ in various respects, but all
are designed to protect certain persons, principally architects, builders, and
other members of the construction industry, from the possibility of defend-
ing claims many years after an owner accepts an improvement to the realty.
The District of Columbia's architects' and builders' statute of repose dif-
fers from statutes enacted in other jurisdictions because it does not identify
the statute's intended beneficiaries. Consequently, while architects, builders,
and other persons involved in the construction process may assert the pro-
tection offered by section 12-310, so, too, may other persons not directly
involved in the construction of a structural improvement to the realty. Sec-
tion 12-310 thus may deprive litigants of potential claims against these more
remote parties and may force those persons specifically excepted from the
statute's operation to bear a disproportionate share of the liability resulting
from defective improvements.
The consequences resulting from the virtually unlimited class of benefi-
ciaries of section 12-310 suggest that the statute should be amended to re-
206. 98 N.M. at 121, 645 P.2d at 1379.
207. Id., 645 P.2d at 1379. See also Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725,
729 (1983); O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal Consulting Eng'r, 410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336, 341
n. 18 (1980) (noting potential constitutional problem if statute of repose provided a person an
unreasonably short period of time to file suit). Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes,
Goodenberger, Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362, 1367 n.7 (6th Cir. 1984) (same). See generally
Rogers, supra note 6, at 19-20; Comment, Limitation of Action, supra note 6, at 372-73. The
statute also may be constitutionally infirm if it denies a reasonable period of time to file a claim
for contribution or indemnity before expiration of the time limitation relating to these claims.
See Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838, 844 (Minn. 1982). Cf Pickett v. Brown, 462
U.S. 1 (1983) (Tennessee statute that provided insufficient time to bring paternity and child
support actions unconstitutional).
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strict its application. Arguably, manufacturers and other persons in the
product's distributive chain should be excluded; such an amendment will
place the risk of defective products on those best able to distribute the loss to
the general population. Similarly, other portions of the statute also must be
amended to clarify the statute's scope and application.
Finally, section 12-310 presents substantial constitutional questions. The
statute should survive most equal protection and due process claims, but the
lack of a grace provision for claims accruing near the expiration of the ten-
year period established by the statute may render the statute constitutionally
infirm. The inclusion of a grace period will eliminate this constitutional con-
cern and will provide persons injured near the tenth anniversary of substan-
tial completion of the improvement an equitable period of time in which to
file suit.

